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The Varsity Blues investigation uncovered a seamy side of
university admissions. Multiple wealthy parents were indicted for
securing their children’s admission to selective institutions
through bribery. Despite the publicity the indictments and guilty
pleas received, and the public schadenfreude over the sight of
celebrities being arrested, the investigation is most notable for
what it did not do: it did not deploy the federal government’s
arsenal of anti-money laundering and anti-corruption tools
against the universities involved. This represents a significant
missed opportunity to address the serious problems that arise from
rationing access to selective institutions via opaque, easily
manipulated admissions processes designed to benefit university
constituencies. Without deploying the same tools used routinely
against other for- and non-profit organizations, the chances for
real reform are significantly reduced. We call for universities and
their boards to be held to the standards applied to other
institutions with respect to corruption and money-laundering in
their oversight of admissions programs.
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INTRODUCTION
On his last day in office, Donald Trump issued 74 pardons.1 One
was to Robert Zangrillo, a parent charged with “fraud, bribery and
money laundering conspiracy in connection with the Varsity Blues
college-admissions scandal.”2 This pardon highlights the failure of
Varsity Blues prosecutors to go the root of the problem by
employing anti-corruption and anti-money laundering tools.3 At
the heart of the case was a lack of transparent admissions practices,
which makes universities vulnerable to corruption.
News accounts of Varsity Blues focus on Rick Singer, a college
admissions consultant, and wealthy and celebrity parents who
hired him to secure admission for their children to elite colleges.
Singer and others used a range of tactics, including falsifying
1. Rebecca Ballhaus & Byron Tau, Trump Issues 74 Pardons, Including to Ex-Aide Steve
Bannon, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2021, 11:39 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumppardons-former-chief-strategist-steve-bannon-11611120199.
2. Id. Zangrillo was accused of paying $200,000 to the bogus foundation called KWF,
discussed below, and $50,000 to the athletics department at USC to get his daughter into
the school.
3. Investigators named the project Varsity Blues after a 1999 film about a small-town
Texas high school athlete seeking admission to Brown University. Jami Ganz, FBI Names
College Admissions Cheating Scandal ‘Operation Varsity Blues’—and Social Media Has Questions,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:45 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/ny-news-operation-varsity-blues-name-criticism-20190312-story.html.
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admissions tests, having ringers take tests for applicants, and
bribing athletic coaches to designate applicants as desirable athletic
recruits. Because the parents paid Singer and his foundation, and
Singer then paid other participants, federal authorities were able to
bring a variety of financial criminal charges. Some parents
negotiated plea bargains and short jail times; others held out for
trial. These accounts frame the scandal as one concerning a rogue
actor and his wealthy clients.4
What is most notable about Varsity Blues is what the
prosecutors did not do.5 While the headlines focused on arrests and
charging celebrity parents such as Felicity Huffman and Lori
4. A 204-page affidavit by the FBI describes assorted activities of many parties. See
Affidavit
in
Support
of
Crim.
Compliant,
(March
11,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1142876/download; see also Arrests Made in Nationwide
College Admissions Scam: Alleged Exam Cheating & Athletic Recruitment Scheme, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/arrests-made-nationwide-collegeadmissions-scam-alleged-exam-cheating-athletic. Varsity Blues is hardly the only current
admissions saga to capture public attention. The elite Sidwell Friends School experienced “a
fantastical, Real Housewives of the Independent Schools cavalcade of hideous parental behavior”
which included “secretly taping conversations” with college counselors and trying to obtain
copies of other students’ records, both potentially involving criminal conduct. Caitlin
Flanagan, The Fury of the Prep-School Parents, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/sidwell-friends-parents-are-behavingbadly/592408/. Varsity Blues also led to a Netflix documentary (an R-rated one!),
OPERATION VARSITY BLUES: THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCANDAL (Netflix Mar. 17, 2021), a
Lifetime film, FRAUD: THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCANDAL (Lifetime 2021), and a novel, JULIE
BUXBAUM, ADMISSION (2020). The latter’s Amazon blurb summarizes the plot as
Lie. Cheat. Bribe. How far would you go to get into your dream school? How far
would your parents go? Inspired by the recent college admissions scandal, this
ripped-from-the-headlines YA novel by the New York Times bestselling author
of Tell Me Three Things sees one teenage girl’s privileged world shatter when her
family’s lies are exposed.
Admission Hardcover – December 1, 2020, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/
Admission-Julie-Buxbaum/dp/1984893629 (last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
5. Singer’s racket collapsed due to an unrelated FBI investigation into a stock scam
rather than by any law enforcement focus on college and university admissions. One target
of the investigation, Morrie Tobin, seeking to get charges or penalties reduced for unrelated
securities law violations, volunteered to investigators in the Boston office what he heard
about people buying a way into preferred schools for their children. Joel Rubin, Matthew
Ormseth, Suhauna Hussain & Richard Winton, The Bizarre Story of the L.A. Dad Who Exposed
the College Admissions Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-morrie-tobin-college-admissions-scandal-20190331-story.html.
Tobin
was sentenced to 12 months in prison. Jennifer Levitz, Original Tipster in College-Admissions
Case Gets Year in Prison, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/originaltipster-in-college-admissions-case-gets-year-in-prison-11597268684. See also MELISSA KORN
& JENNIFER LEVITZ, UNACCEPTABLE: PRIVILEGE, DECEIT & THE MAKING OF THE COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS SCANDAL 228–33 (2021).
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Loughlin,6 prosecutors did not bring charges against the
universities involved or the officials in charge of admissions. Had
federal prosecutors characterized the corrupt admissions processes
they uncovered as money laundering, both the universities and
many university officials would have been at risk of serious
criminal and civil penalties. With that leverage, the Department of
Justice could have secured sweeping reforms of college admissions
at those schools, increasing transparency and fairness by forcing
universities to adopt the compliance programs routine in the
financial sector.
Universities fail to employ compliance measures that are
routine in other complex for-profit and non-profit industries. The
solution to the problems uncovered by the Varsity Blues
investigation is to reduce the opportunities for corruption in the
process going forward, not simply arrest those clumsy enough to
be caught. Here we explore how application of anti-money
laundering and anti-corruption measures to universities as
organizations, and to their boards, would address the problem
created by using nontransparent admissions processes to allocate
scarce and highly valued admission to selective institutions.
That this problem goes beyond Singer-style corruption of a few
bad actors is seen in the details of Harvard’s admissions process as
revealed in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows
of Harvard College (Harvard Corp.).7 Harvard, like other schools,
relies on secret subjective personality scores. Examples include
lower subjective scores given to Asian applicants and substantial
advantages for legacy applicants and desired athletes. These are
difficult to explain as anything other than intentional manipulation
6. Typical media coverage is seen in Tom Cleary, Operation Varsity Blues: 5 Fast Facts
You Need to Know, HEAVY (Mar. 12, 2019, 9:37 PM), https://heavy.com/news/
2019/03/operation-varsity-blues.
7. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.
(Harvard Corp.), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019). The court held Harvard’s admissions
process survived strict scrutiny because it served a compelling interest and was narrowly
tailored to achieve diversity. Applicants were afforded a holistic review. Diversity included
a range of qualities and experiences. Race was used as a plus factor, in a flexible way. For
background, see Delano R. Franklin & Samuel W. Zwickel, Harvard, SFFA Dispute
‘Discrimination’ in Lower Personal Scores for Asian American Applicants, HARV. CRIMSON (June
16, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/6/16/admissions-suit-arguments/;
Shera S. Avi-Yonah & Molly C. McCafferty, Asian-American Harvard Applicants Saw Lowest
Admit Rate of Any Racial Group from 1995 to 2013, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/10/19/acceptance-rates-by-race/.
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of results by admissions offices.8 Varsity Blues could have opened
the door to a broader evaluation of elite institutions’ admissions
practices. We examine the problem through the lens of economic
theory, drawing on experiences of how corruption can infect
discretionary allocation of scarce goods, to show why even
high-profile prosecutions of celebrity parents will not solve the
problem.9 Ending corruption in college admissions and providing
real equality of opportunity that makes the advantages of an
elite education available to a diverse population of applicants
requires a structural change within higher education focusing on
greater transparency about the decision-making process, and a
frank discussion about the distribution of access to elite networks.
In Varsity Blues, the Department of Justice missed an opportunity
to use its resources to push higher education in the direction of
greater transparency.
The economics of access to elite educational institutions is
straightforward. Such colleges provide a good for which the
demand far exceeds available supply. The limited supply of places
at these schools is crucial to their desirability.10 The schools to
which the Varsity Blues parents sought admission for their children
could admit freshman classes many times their current sizes
without reducing the objective measures of quality of the entering

8. The policy is similar at other elite schools; we use Harvard as an example. See
Delano R. Franklin & Molly C. McCafferty, Here’s How the Harvard Admissions Process Really
Works, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/
10/29/how-to-get-in-to-harvard.
9. For ease of exposition, we refer to higher education as a “good” here rather than
use the more cumbersome economic term of “combination of goods and services” that would
be more accurate.
10. JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 8 (2006) (“Though often viewed as forwardlooking and driven by their commitment to high ideals, the Big Three were more often
deeply conservative and surprisingly insecure about their status in the higher-education
pecking order and intensely preoccupied with maintaining their close ties to the
privileged.”). While the University of Southern California may not be of Harvard quality, it
was particularly popular with the children of the rich and famous involved in Varsity Blues.
The admission rate at USC is low at 11.4 percent at the time the Varsity Blues matter was
underway. (Note that Karabel’s B.A. and Ph.D. are from Harvard; he is a Professor of
Sociology at UC Berkeley.) See also Allen Grove, University of Southern California: Acceptance
Rate and Admissions Statistics, THOUGHTCO. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/
usc-university-of-southern-california-admissions-787246.
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class.11 The schools manipulate prices, of which tuition need only
be a part, in a nontransparent manner, much as they do with
admission criteria. We argue that the stakeholders in these
institutions seek to maximize the institutions’ prestige and revenue
over time, which requires rationing of opportunities to attend to
preserve the institutions’ elite character.12 Stakeholders—faculty,
alumni, administration, and students—all benefit by limiting access
as this increases the value of the signal their affiliation with the
institution sends to others.13 Rationing highly valued slots in elite
colleges occurs through a mysterious-to-outsiders, opaque
11. Harvard usually admits about five percent of its applicants. Delano R. Franklin &
Samuel W. Zwickel, Record-Low 4.59 Percent of Applicants Accepted to Harvard Class of 2022,
HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/3/29/
harvard-regular-admissions-2022/. Many denied admission have superlative SAT and ACT
scores. Allen Grove, Harvard University: Acceptance Rates and Admission Statistics,
THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/harvard-universityadmissions-787621.
12. See JEFFREY SELINGO, WHO GETS IN AND WHY: A YEAR INSIDE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
11 (2020) (“[I]t’s important to know that the baffling process you [the applicant] face is
ultimately not a judgment about you or your potential.”). Selingo is a longtime reporter who
focuses on higher education and was editor of the Chronicle of Higher Education. He spent a
year embedded in several universities prior to publishing this book.
13. Economists have developed a large literature on signaling theory. It plays a large
role in most human interaction in which education is prominent. Numerous Nobel prize
winners in economics contributed to this large literature. In education, this includes Kenneth
J. Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1973); Paul Krugman, And Now for
Something Completely Different: An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality, in THE
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ON WAGES 15 (Robert Feenstra ed., 2000); and A. MICHAEL
SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING
PROCESSES (1974). When Spence was awarded the Nobel prize for his work on signaling, the
committee noted, “[a]n important example is education as a signal of high individual
productivity in the labor market. It is not necessary for education to have intrinsic value.
Costly investment in education as such signals high ability.” A. Michael Spence—Facts, NOBEL
PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2001/spence/facts/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2021). When employers are screening for potential employees, the information
is imperfect about on-the-job performance, so it is natural to look for signals of ability. Signals
are imperfect but some signal is better than none. For a survey of the literature on point, see
John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 432
(2001).
A decade or so ago it was thought that the Internet would allow free, quality
education to be made available globally, thereby allowing most anyone the chance to have a
Harvard-quality education and possibly gutting colleges. While MOOCs (Massive Open
Online Courses) are widely available with instructors of sterling qualifications and ability,
the courses have not swept away traditional residential colleges because employers are
looking for complex signals that go well beyond demonstrating mastery of specific bits of
knowledge. Colleges provide such signals; successful completion of online courses do not.
Elite colleges, of course, provide the most valuable signals.
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admissions process rather than through a transparent mechanism.
Those seeking the benefit of that signal (the “demanders” in this
market) are infrequent participants in the admissions market and
so unfamiliar with how it operates. That makes corrupt methods,
such as those provided by Singer and other costly admissions
counselors who need not be involved in bribery, effective.14
Fixing the problem requires more than prosecuting individuals
caught by occasional investigations. As discussed below, the
leading statement of guidance for anti-bribery and corruption
compliance, issued by the Wolfsberg Group, an association of
global banks that develops frameworks and guidance for
management of financial crime risks, requires that active efforts be
taken to prevent exactly the types of activities engaged in by Singer
and his coconspirators.15 Under federal law, agents of entities
receiving federal program benefits of more than $100,000—a
category that includes every selective university—are criminally
liable for soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept bribes
involving “any thing of value of $5,000 or more.”16 Similarly, the
person paying the bribe is also criminally liable.17 Financial entities
are routinely sanctioned, often heavily, for violation of anti-bribery
and corruption rules. For example, between 2008 and 2019, global
regulators issued $36 billion in fines to financial institutions for
such violations, with $4.3 billion in fines issued by U.S. regulators
between October 2018 and December 2019, up from $1.5 billion in
fines between July 2017 and September 2018.18 Fines of that
magnitude would surely get the attention of even the wealthiest
university. Holding universities to account for their laxity in
permitting the type of behavior uncovered by Varsity Blues,
and engaging in other behavior that would be held to be corrupt
14. Think of other markets in which people are infrequent buyers of costly goods, such
as housing. We may pay a fee to a realtor for assistance in searching the market, but the
process is not mysterious and there are no stories of high-priced “consultants” a la Singer
who make deals happen.
15. WOLFSBERG ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION (ABC) COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME
GUIDANCE, WOLFSBERG GROUP (2017), https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/
files/wb/pdfs/wolfsberg-standards/3.%20Wolfsberg-Group-ABC-Guidance-June-2017.pdf.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).
17. Id. § 666(a)(2).
18. Another Fine Mess—Global Research Report on Financial Institution Fines and
Enforcement Actions, FENERGO (2019), https://www.fenergo.com/report/global-researchreport-on-financial-institution-fines-and-enforcement-actions-2/.
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in other industries, requires no more of colleges than is required of
other institutions dealing in valuable services. One could argue
that we should hold institutions of higher education to higher
standards than banks. Instead, we allow them to behave at the level
of fly-by-night finance companies.
The focus on compliance should be on boards of trustees that
have the ability to establish safeguards for admission processes.
They should be held to the same standards as other entities’ boards.
For example, corporate boards have a duty of loyalty that includes
the responsibility to exercise sufficient oversight to prevent
regulatory problems analogous to those present in Varsity Blues.
Delaware’s Caremark doctrine—”one of the few judicial decisions
that professionals will know by name”19—imposes a duty of
oversight on boards “to exercise oversight” and to monitor a
business’ “operational viability, legal compliance, and financial
performance.”20 The Delaware Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
this in Marchand v. Barnhill, where it held that “[a] board’s ‘utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting
system exists’ is an act of bad faith in the breach of the duty of
loyalty.”21 Given the obvious potential for problems in the
distribution of valuable offers of admission to selective institutions
through opaque admissions processes, it would be odd not to hold
college and university boards to a similar duty.22 The Varsity Blues
19. Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647,
648 (2018).
20. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
21. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at
971.). The Delaware court’s refashioning of Caremark from a duty of care issue into a duty of
loyalty issue suggests that boards that were asleep at the switch might be able to escape
liability. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 599–600 (2008). We agree with Bainbridge and his
coauthors that this is an absurd result. Note that the Delaware courts have not recognized a
breach of duty for failure to monitor when the board’s inaction results only in harm to the
business but only where there are, as in Varsity Blues, wrongful acts or violations of the law.
See Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware
Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 212 (2011).
22. Of course, few, if any, universities are organized as Delaware corporations. But
Caremark and its progeny are valuable guideposts, emitting as they do what Claire Hill has
termed “a considerable penumbra” that influences our understanding of “soft law” norms.
See Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (2018). As Prof. Hill notes:
In many spheres, corporate law has a considerable penumbra. Forces that
shape the penumbra include dicta in judicial opinions and other pronouncements
by the judiciary in various contexts, both of which the Delaware judiciary is
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investigations, the scholarly literature on college admissions, and
the evidence of nontransparent processes that have emerged from
litigation over admissions suggest that many selective institutions
lack even a minimal “reasonable information and reporting
system” concerning their processes.
In this Article, we use Varsity Blues to illustrate the conditions
that produce corruption. We first provide accounts of Varsity Blues
and two other instances in which the curtain was pulled back to
reveal how admissions works in selective institutions. Next, we
discuss the college admissions process, showing how it is,
especially at elite schools, a substitution of pliable, opaque
administrative processes for clear standards. We critique Varsity
Blues’ sole reliance on individual criminal sanctions as a deterrent
for corruption and suggest a framework for identifying where
corruption is most likely to occur and a strategy for reducing its role
in the allocation of scarce goods that includes institutional criminal
sanctions. Finally, we offer an alternative approach based on
identifying where corruption is likely to emerge as an acceptable
solution to the absence of markets in the allocation of goods
and services.
I. THE VARSITY BLUES AND OTHER STORIES
Operation Varsity Blues uncovered, as Senator Elizabeth Warren
said, an “example of how the rich and powerful know how to take
care of their own.”23 As of January 2021, more than fifty people had
particularly known for; law firm memoranda to clients that tell those clients,
including the companies’ directors and officers, what they should do, rather than
telling them the minimum they must do to avoid liability; and pressure from
various constituencies, sometimes from the shareholders in the form of
shareholder proposals, and sometimes from expressed or perceived customer and
regulator sensitivities to certain conduct or messaging. The penumbra affects what
companies do, and the effect is recursive, insofar as what companies do creates
norms that come to be part of the penumbra.
Id. at 684.
23. Aaron Katersky, Bill Hutchinson & Mike Levine, Massive College Admissions
Cheating Scandal Snares Hollywood Stars Lori Loughlin, Felicity Huffman, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13,
2019, 3:49 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/hollywood-actors-ceos-charged-nationwidecollege-admissions-cheating/story?id=61627873. Sen. Warren is reputed to be worth $18
million and holds a seat in the U.S. Senate, which could be interpreted as making her one of
the rich and powerful. Elizabeth Warren Net Worth 2020, NET WORTH PORTAL (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://thenetworthportal.com/wiki-2018-2019-2020-2021/politician/elizabeth-warrennet-worth/. As Selingo notes:
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been indicted in connection with the Varsity Blues investigation,
most for mail fraud, honest services fraud, and money laundering.24
In addition to Varsity Blues, recent litigation over whether
Harvard’s admissions process discriminated against Asian
American applicants, and earlier litigation over the role of
race-based preferences in higher education, provide additional
insight into the process beyond the legality of specific university
measures.25 Finally, several universities were caught having
fabricated admissions data in pursuit of higher rankings. These
examples provide considerable evidence of how institutions
manage admissions.
A. Varsity Blues
Varsity Blues is the story of an entrepreneur who spotted an
opportunity and took a wrong turn. At the center was Rick Singer,
who worked his way up in the world of college admissions to run
a successful and apparently mostly legitimate admissions
counseling business. After holding jobs in different organizations
and coaching non-revenue generating sports at colleges and high
schools,26 he founded a college admissions counseling business:
Future Stars.27 However, Singer “wasn’t getting rich” and was
looking to boost his income.28 The buyer of his business recalled
Figuring out the rules of the game of selective admissions is a relentless
pursuit in economically privileged communities among parents who want their
kids to go to what they define as the best colleges. They don’t necessarily see
higher education as a public good designed to benefit society as a whole but one
that should serve their own specific ambitions and goals.
SELINGO, supra note 12, at 108.
24. Many plea bargains have been reached; more criminal cases are underway at the
time of this writing. Most guilty pleas are for fraud, not money laundering. See Investigations
of
College
Admissions
and
Testing
Bribery
Scheme,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/investigations-college-admissions-and-testing-briberyscheme (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
25. Harvard will be discussed below. Yale has also been sued for race discrimination
in admissions. See Justice Department Finds Yale Illegally Discriminates Against Asians and
Whites in Undergraduate Admissions in Violation of Federal Civil-Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-finds-yale-illegallydiscriminates-against-asians-and-whites-undergraduate.
26. The discussion here draws on E.J. Dickson, Who is Rick Singer, the Mastermind Behind
the College Admissions Scam? ROLLING STONE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/
culture/culture-news/rick-singer-college-admissions-scam-807736/.
27. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 15–16.
28. Id. at 20–21.
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that families told him Singer wrote a child’s application essays and
advised a white applicant to list himself as Hispanic. 29 After selling
that company, Singer worked for other admissions counseling
firms before founding “The College Source” in 2004.30
The College Source charged parents a fee to coach their high
school students in preparing college applications.31 Customers
praised Singer’s ability to motivate their children to do what was
needed to get into a desired college, such as studying for the SAT.
The company brought in over a million dollars the first year with
only one person besides Singer on the payroll.32 The demand for
Singer’s services was growing as the University of California
System schools became more competitive due to a growing
applicant pool.33 Singer began to advise clients to have their children
tested for learning disabilities to gain advantages on the SAT and
29. Id.
30. Id. at 20–22.
31. Singer charged $1,500 a year if the student started with him as a high school
freshman, $2,000 per year if the student began as a sophomore, and $2,500 a year if the
student started with him as a junior or senior. Kathy Robertson, Thousands Turn to CollegePrep Coach, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (Feb. 6, 2005), https://www.bizjournals.com/
sacramento/stories/2005/02/07/story7.html. The descriptions available of these operations
do not suggest Singer was engaged in any illegal activities in this period. It seems he was
providing cheerleader services to high school students, not running substantive SAT or ACT
preparation courses, but these were voluntarily contracted services.
32. Part of Singer’s success with the College Source came from clever marketing as
well. His initial “advisory group” included the president-emeritus of Stanford, the president
of the Carnegie Foundation, and the president of Occidental College; the latter said, “Rick is
really great at getting at the heart of what kids and families want—and finding the right
match.” Id. However, Singer was unable to maintain his elite academic advisory board; the
former Stanford president was not on the advisory board for long and Singer was unable to
draw in replacement big names. Mentions occur in various stories of big names being
involved, but there appears to be no evidence of such. The boards of entities in IRS filings do
not show big-name outsiders. Like many promoters, Singer liked to talk and drop names.
See, e.g., Joel Rubin & Matthew Ormseth, Rick Singer Had Grand Plans Beyond College
Admissions. Then Scandal Brought Him Down, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019, 8:01 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-college-admissions-scandal-rick-singerbusiness-20190429-story.html. One report claimed, “[h]e had a board stuffed with former
presidents of Princeton, Stanford . . . as well as the former Chancellor of UCLA.” Cory
Doctorow, How the ‘Varsity Blues’ Admissions Scam Punished Deserving, Hard-Working Kids so
that Mediocre Kids of the Super-Rich Could Prosper, BOINGBOING (Oct. 8, 2019, 9:02 AM),
https://boingboing.net/2019/10/08/michelle-janavs.html. This claim is not seen
elsewhere, so the claim may be incorrect. See, e.g., Meghna Chakrabarti & Allison Pohle,
‘Mistake’ To Suggest ‘Everyone’s Using the Side Door,’ Former Stanford Admissions Officer Says,
WBUR (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2019/03/13/college-admissionsscandal-doj-stanford.
33. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 32.
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ACT by being given more time.34 And Singer began to brag about
using athletics to get non-athletes into selective colleges, telling a
“skeptical friend” that colleges did not audit athletics claims.35
In 2007 Singer founded his third venture in college admissions
counseling: The Edge College & Career Network, LLC (The Edge).36
He described it as “the world’s largest private Life Coaching and
College Counselling Company” and claimed more than ninety
thousand clients.37 Singer brought on a network of remote workers
to help counsel high school students around the country, splitting
fees with counselors.38 Singer established the non-profit Key
Worldwide Foundation (KWF), approved by the IRS in 2013.39 He
moved his base of operations from Sacramento to tonier Newport
Beach.40 KWF claimed in its mission statement: “The Key
Worldwide Foundation endeavors to provide education that
would normally be unattainable to underprivileged students, not
only attainable but realistic. . . . Our contributions to major athletic
university programs, may help to provide placement to students
that may not have access under normal channels.”41
The second sentence was partially true given that Singer
donated to athletic programs as part of his scheme, but the first
likely is not. While there were claims in Singer’s IRS filings of help
for less privileged students, whether any occurred is disputed.42

34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 37.
36. See The Edge College & Career Network, LLC, BIZAPEDIA, https://www.bizapedia.com/
ca/the-edge-college-and-career-network-llc.html (updated Mar. 14, 2021).
37. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 59.
38. Id. at 62–63.
39. See Sam Brunson, Key Wordwide Foundation and College Admissions Scams, SURLY
SUBGROUP (Mar. 13, 2019), https://surlysubgroup.com/2019/03/13/key-worldwidefoundation-and-college-admissions-scams/ (containing links to the IRS filing and
other documents).
40. When things came apart, he had to sell his Newport Beach home. Marilyn Kalfus,
Rick Singer, College Admissions Scandal Ringleader, Sells Newport Beach House for $2.52 Million,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/04/05/rick-singercollege-admissions-scandal-ringleader-sells-newport-beach-house-for-2-52-million/.
41. See Key Worldwide Foundation, GREATNONPROFITS, https://greatnonprofits.org/
org/key-worldwide-foundation?express=1 (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
42. For example, KWF claimed it made a gift of $19,000 to Friends of Cambodia, but
that foundation denies it received such a transfer. Stephen Stock & Kevin Nious, College
Admissions Scam: Follow the Money Behind the Key Worldwide Foundation, NBC BAY AREA (Mar.
13, 2019), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/college-admissions-scam-follow-the-
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KWF allowed some of the money parents paid to Singer to gain
their children admission to an elite school to be charitable gifts,
reducing their net cost via a tax deduction.43 This also enabled
parents to pretend that they were not engaged in bribery but were
being philanthropic, perhaps lowering the psychological costs of
their actions.
Singer appears to have started making payments at least by
2008 to relevant university employees, mostly coaches, to get his
clients’ children admitted.44 From then until his arrest, Singer took
in about $25 million.45 Assisting Singer in the internal operation at
The Edge and KWF was Steven Masera, an accountant,46 who
pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy charges.47 By the time his
operation had become a scam, Singer offered to doctor children’s
standardized test scores.48
money-behind-the-key-worldwide-foundation/160340/. IRS filings showed zero payments
to Singer or others involved with KWF. Id.
43. Korn and Levitz quote a parent as saying “Oh, even better!” upon learning she
could write off the fee for cheating on her son’s ACT. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 156.
Singer’s Indictment lists racketeering, money laundering, fraud, and obstruction of justice.
See Information at 1, United States v. Singer, No. 19-CR-10078-RWZ (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1142901/download.
44. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 42–43.
45. Jennifer Levitz, More Parents Enter Guilty Pleas in College Admissions Cheating Case,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-wave-of-parentsbegin-entering-guilty-pleas-in-college-admissions-cheating-case-11571673455.
46. Indictment at 3, United States v. Ernst, 502 F. Supp. 3d 637 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 19CR-10081-IT), https://www.justice.gov/file/1142881/download.
47. Darrell Smith, Folsom Accountant Pleads Guilty in ‘Varsity Blues’ College Admission
Scam, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 27, 2019), https://account.sacbee.com/paywall/subscriberonly?resume=232025827&intcid=ab_archive.
48. Singer could arrange for the SAT or ACT to be taken by a third party, who would
get a score which was high enough (but not so high as to arouse suspicions) that would be
reported to universities as the applicant’s score. Payments to Singer for this service ran
$15,000 to $75,000. Indictment, supra note 46, at 8. In some instances, Singer arranged for the
student to claim a medical condition to allow the exam to be taken at a special location where
the student could be coached or given assistance. Assisting in this were Igor Dvorskiy and
Lisa Williams. See Kate Taylor, Fallout from College Admissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/us/college-admissions-probe.html. Both
were named in the same indictment. Indictment, supra note 46, at 1. Dvorskiy was director
of the West Hollywood College Preparatory School, where his mother was principal, and he
was an administrator of SAT and ACT exams. He pled guilty to charges that he allowed
exams to be rigged for $10,000. West Hollywood School Head to Plead Guilty in Admissions
Scandal, CBS L.A (Oct. 2, 2019, 8:41 AM), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2019/
10/02/west-hollywood-school-head-igor-dvorskiy-to-plead-guilty-in-admissions-scandal/.
Williams worked at a public high school in Houston and was an administrator of SAT and
ACT exams. She would allow Riddell to sit to take exams under the names of Singer’s clients’
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For elite schools, high standardized test scores are not enough
to secure admission, so Singer fabricated ties to athletics.49 Parents
made payments to KWF, Singer then paid a coach at the preferred
school, either personally or to the coach’s program. Most coaches
were in non-revenue generating sports (not football or
basketball).50 These coaches helped with admission by designating
applicants as athletes and so getting special consideration by the
admissions department.51 Singer referred to this as the “side door”

children. Indictment, supra note 46, at 8. Similarly, Mark Riddell, who worked at IMG
Academy in Florida, a high-end boarding school that focuses on intensive athletic training
and academics, as “director of college entrance exam preparation” was experienced in
preparing students to take college admissions tests. Matt Baker, IMG Academy Suspends Mark
Riddell After College Admissions Bribery Scandal, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.tampabay.com/sports/high-schools/2019/03/13/img-academy-suspendsmark-riddell-after-college-admissions-bribery-scandal/. Riddell took SAT or ACT exams for
students in special locations arranged due to students’ alleged health problems; he did this
at least twenty-five times at $10,000 per exam. Joey Garrison, Mark Riddell, Test Taker Ace in
College Admissions Cheating Case, Pleads Guilty in Court, USA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2019, 6:26 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/04/12/mark-riddell-test-taker-collegeadmissions-cheating-scandal-court/3445143002/; Information, United States v. Riddell, No.
19-CR-10074-NMG (D. Mass Feb. 5, 2020), https://storage.courtlistener.com/
recap/gov.uscourts.mad.207170/gov.uscourts.mad.207170.1.0.pdf (filed on Riddell for mail
fraud and money laundering). He pled guilty. Doha Madani, Mark Riddell, College Admission
Scandal Test-taker, Pleads Guilty, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019, 1:26 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/harvard-alum-who-took-exams-students-collegeadmissions-scandal-pleads-n993956.
49. Joey Garrison & Maria Puente, Some Faked Athletic Profiles in Largest-Ever Bribery
Case to Get Kids into College, USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2019, 3:26 PM),
https://usatodayhss.com/2019/college-bribery-case-fake-athletic-profiles. Reliance on
coaches has long been a part of elite school admissions. See, e.g., KARABEL, supra note 10, at
525. In 1979, the Princeton admissions dean wrote:
Because the admission staff alone cannot determine which of the applicants are
likely to make the greatest contribution to the athletic programs of the University,
we rely upon the assessments of the various coaches. The Department of Athletics
provides names of athletically talented candidates in each sport, with an
assessment of each individual’s athletic ability. As in all other cases, the Admission
Committee is not bound by these evaluations, but they are referred to frequently
as we make fine distinctions among fairly similar candidates.
Id.
50. Scholarships in sports such as football have been aimed at lower middle class and
minority athletes, but in total, they tilt toward the wealthy with scholarships for sports such
as crew, lacrosse, squash, tennis, horseback riding, skiing, sailing, and fencing, or even polo.
These scholarships are made to order for sale. See SELINGO, supra note 12, at 148 (“Singer
recognized that the majority of college athletes play in relative obscurity on teams few
spectators ever go to see.”).
51. Even where a coach cannot designate a student for admission, they can confer
substantial advantages. See id. at 152–53.
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of admissions.52 Singer’s applicants did not receive athletic
scholarships, and most never went near the team for which they
were allegedly recruited, minimizing negative impacts on the
coach’s win/loss record.53 Bribes to coaches were insufficient,
however. Presenting the applicants as athletes required Singer to
help create false resumes showing students to be star athletes
worthy of a spot on a college team.54 Similarly, non-test academic
credentials were sometimes bolstered.55
In March of 2019, the first complaint focused on parents was
filed in federal court in Boston. It named thirty-two parties to the
For athletes, getting into a selective school is a matching game played with
coaches rather than a lottery played with the admissions office. Athletes and
coaches must first find each other and be a good match. Once that happens, the
coach becomes the applicant’s guide and advocate, assisting him through the
admissions process.
Id.
52. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 67. As Korn and Levitz note, the “side door” was
“a fancy way of referring to bribery and cheating.” Id. at 82.
53. Coaches liked Singer’s “side door” as it eliminated any pressure from the
donor/parents to have their children actually play. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 120–21.
The list of indicted coaches, by school, appears in the Appendix. Singer also used
intermediaries to get to coaches. For example, Gordon Ernst, a former tennis coach for the
Obamas, was president of a private tennis academy in Houston. Singer paid Fox hundreds
of thousands of dollars to help get the tennis coach at the University of Texas at Austin on
board and for help getting an applicant labeled a possible recruit for the University of San
Diego. Laurel J. Sweet, Ex-Obama Tennis Pro Pleads Not Guilty to ‘Varsity Blues’ Conspiracy,
BOSTON HERALD (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/03/25/exobama-tennis-pro-pleads-not-guilty-to-varsity-blues-conspiracy/. Ernst agreed to plead
guilty. Anemona Hartocollis, Former Georgetown Tennis Coach Agrees to Plead Guilty in
Admissions Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/09/15/us/georgetown-tennis-coach-guilty-varsity-blues.html. Similarly, Martin Fox,
another key figure in the scandal, apparently has a long history of behind-the-scenes activity
in college sports. See Pat Forde, Pete Thamel & Dan Wetzel, Meet Martin Fox, the Mysterious
Houston Sports Figure Caught Up in the College Bribery Scandal, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://sports.yahoo.com/a-whole-new-world-of-corruption-how-houston-middlemanmartin-fox-fit-into-operation-varsity-blues-011841886.html; Stephanie Pagones, Varsity
Blues: Four More Plead Guilty to College Cheating Scandal, FOX BUS. (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/varsity-blues-guilty-college-cheating.
Likewise
Martin Riddell, a former tennis pro, took tests on behalf of Singer’s clients. Milton J. Valencia,
Test Taker in College Admissions Scam Pleads Guilty in Boston, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 12, 2019,
9:54 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/04/12/test-taker-college-admissions
-cheating-scam-slated-plead-guilty-Friday-boston/NWnRQq3slzuQ12BHmsxG0L/story.html.
54. See Chris Quintana, Fake Disabilities, Photoshopped Faces, USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2019,
3:35
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2019/03/12/felicityhuffman-lori-laughlin-how-college-admissions-scam-worked/3142160002/.
55. This was one function apparently provided by Key and KWF employee, Mikaela
Stanford, who helped falsify grades. Indictment, supra note 46, at 3, 9.
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scheme and included allegations of the use of ringers to take the
SAT or ACT tests on behalf of clients’ children as well as coaching
during the tests. Parents paid Singer, usually via his foundation, to
generate high scores and to bribe coaches for obtaining admission.56
The “Singer as criminal entrepreneur” account of Varsity Blues
ends here and is straightforward: well-meaning educational
institutions were duped by a clever fraudster who undermined
thoughtful admissions processes by tempting coaches of minor
sports, engaging in outright fraud, and subverting the test security
measures taken by unsuspecting administrators of the SAT and
ACT.57 Scams involving admissions tests had been prosecuted by
November 2011, which should have been sufficient to alert both
testing organizations and admissions departments of the need for
greater security.58 Federal law enforcement caught and punished
the kingpin and his henchpersons (if only as a result of an
accident),59 and the culpable parents were chastened and punished.
The institutions vowed no future Rick Singer would be able to
repeat his subversion of their meritocratic allocation of the scarce
seats in their freshman classes.60
This is a familiar narrative when corruption is uncovered.61
However, when one looks inside a corrupt organization, it becomes
56. The list of all parents, as of August 2021, is in Affidavit in Support of Crim.
Compliant, supra note 4.
57. Selingo notes that the College Board, which administers the SAT, sold 80 million
names of prospective students to colleges in 2010, although there were only 5.2 million SAT
and PSAT takers. The College Board refuses to disclose the current sales. SELINGO, supra note
12, at 26. This has “changed the dynamics of student recruiting” and shifted colleges’ efforts
to direct mail and targeted recruiting. Id. at 31. This makes them more like financial firms
and strengthens our argument that the process should be subjected to the same regulations
as govern that sector.
58. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 50–51.
59. See supra text accompanying note 5.
60. The University of California System, like many others, audited admissions
processes after the fact. New controls were to be put in place. See Nanette Asimov, Audit
Finds Troubling Errors in UC Admissions, in Wake of Varsity Blues Scandal, S.F. CHRON. (Mar.
18, 2020, 9:43 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/education/article/Audit-finds-troublingerrors-in-UC-admissions-in-15141448.php.
61. Korn and Levitz report that UCLA had discovered that UCLA’s tennis program
had been inappropriately trading designation as an athlete for donations, leading to a review
of tennis recruits between 2004 and 2014 that showed the families of “a relatively high
percentage” of men’s tennis recruits who proved to have limited tennis skills made
significant donations to the tennis program. Just two of these had used Singer. As they note,
the result was a “[f]act pattern found. Eyebrows raised. Then lowered.” KORN & LEVITZ,
supra note 5, at 86–87. An investigation into favoritism in admissions at the University of
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clear how the operations were perverted to serve multiple private
interests. The story’s familiarity reveals the problem—simply
catching and punishing individual perpetrators does not prevent it
from being repeated again. Only substantive changes in operations
and governance limits repetition.
Singer’s scheme is not merely an embarrassment for Duke,
Georgetown, San Diego, Southern California, Stanford, Texas,
UCLA, Wake Forest, and Yale for being duped;62 a personal tragedy
for the students admitted under false pretenses (who faced
embarrassment, damaged relationships with their parents, and in
some cases, expulsion);63 or an opportunity for the rest of us to
enjoy some schadenfreude when considering the various elites (e.g.
law partners, actors, and executives) headed for jail sentences and
felony records.64 Varsity Blues illustrates the vulnerability of
nonmarket allocations of scarce goods to corruption. Focusing on
the thrill of watching our social betters being hauled up for tawdry
crimes misses the critical lesson: nonmarket allocations of scarce
goods requires safeguards against corruption to replace the
disciplining role of market institutions. Varsity Blues teaches that
even presumptively well-meaning institutions such as elite
educational institutions need substantive controls and oversight to
prevent corruption in their processes. Leaders of institutions must
hold their institutions accountable for operations and compliance
to the laws and in turn must be held accountable when they fail to
do so. With a narrow focus on low-level participants in the
corruption, there will not be lasting change. The Varsity Blues
Texas at Austin found a pattern suggesting “affirmative action for the advantaged.” Id. at
87–88. UT’s president, William Powers, responded to the report by an outside investigative
agency, “[i]t is my observation that some similar process exists at virtually every selective
university in America, and it does so because it serves the best interests of the institutions.”
Id. at 88.
62. See Appendix for list of schools and the scams involved.
63. See, e.g., 2 Student “Athletes” Have Now Been Expelled in the College Admissions
Scandal Fallout, VOGUE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/article/stanford-collegeadmissions-scandal-fallout-expelled; see also Jenna Lemoncelli & Allison Swan, Olivia Jade &
Other Students in College Scandal Will Have Difficult Time Getting into Other Universities,
HOLLYWOOD LIFE (Apr. 1, 2019), https://newsneednews.com/lifestyle/olivia-jade-otherstudents-in-college-scandal-will-have-difficult-time-getting-into-other-universities/.
64. Among media pundits poking fun at the defendants was Rex Huppke, College
Cheating Scandal Unfairly Targets the Wealthy, to Whom We Owe So Much, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13,
2019, 9:10 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/rex-huppke/ct-met-collegeadmissions-bribery-varsity-blues-huppke-20190312-story.html.
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university board members and executives appear to have been
willfully ignorant or to have failed in the discharge of their duties.
In short, Varsity Blues shows how corruption appears when the
honest markets (or market substitutes) are deeply flawed.
B. What Suits over Admissions Teach Us About Admissions
Selective universities’ admissions policies are subjected to
periodic attacks by unsuccessful applicants, interest groups, and
public authorities concerned about discrimination.65 For example,
the Department of Justice recently alleged systematic
discrimination in admissions by Yale University against Asian
Americans and whites.66 After almost fifty years of litigation over
the hotly contested issue of the role of race and ethnicity in college
admissions, the legalities of considering race in admissions remain
unclear (and well beyond the scope of this Article).67 What is
relevant here is what these cases have revealed about the
admissions processes at the institutions that have been sued. The
recent lawsuit (currently on appeal) by Asian American applicants
against Harvard led to a “treasure trove” of documents being made
public.68 Courts have struggled to articulate clear standards for
evaluating such challenges, in part because admission practices are
murky.69 In reviewing the claims and defenses, the courts have not
65. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). The Court upheld carefully constructed programs to
achieve sufficient racial diversity.
66. Melissa Korn, Yale Discriminated by Race in Undergraduate Admissions, Justice
Department Says, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justicedepartment-finds-yale-discriminated-based-on-race-in-undergraduate-admissions11597351675. The Biden Administration dropped the lawsuit in February 2021. Tucker
Higgins, Justice Department Drops Suit Accusing Yale of Discriminating Against White and Asian
Applicants, in Reversal from Trump Era, CNBC (Feb. 3, 2021, 10:56 PM EST),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/03/doj-drops-suit-accusing-yale-of-discriminating-againstwhite-asian-students.html.
67. Every Supreme Court decision in the area results in a judgment that the law
remains unclear. See Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action
in Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201 (2006) (reviewing pre-Grutter cases).
68. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 160. The suit was rejected by the First Circuit. Students
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020).
69. Schools may use Bakke and other race-based admission cases as a cover for
“holistic” admissions processes. Affirmative action admissions for underserved groups need
not conflict with transparent admissions processes subject to critical inspection, so we wish
to set that issue aside.
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endorsed the opacity of the admissions procedures. Rather, they
have stressed the need for data. As Justice Kennedy noted in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin, “The type of data collected, and the
manner in which it is considered, will have a significant bearing on
how the University must shape its admissions policy to satisfy strict
scrutiny in the years to come.”70
Most importantly for our purposes, one of the most striking
features of these schools’ defenses of their admissions practices is
their insistence on preserving highly subjective elements in
admissions.71 For example, former Solicitor General, Archibald
Cox, argued in Harvard’s amicus brief in the DeFunis challenge to
the University of Washington’s affirmative action policies that:
Harvard’s long experience in the area of undergraduate
education . . . highlights the dangers of substituting an iron rule
of law for the discretion of academic authorities to make a
conscious selection of qualified students from the greatest variety
of cultural, social, and economic backgrounds in order to improve
the educational experience of the whole student body.72

Cox contended that “if promise of high scholarship were the
sole or even predominant criterion, Harvard College would lose a
great deal of its vitality and the quality of the educational
experience offered to all students would suffer.”73
This is strong language that is not supported by what actually
happens in admissions. For example, in his assessment, Karabel
concluded that an elite school’s vigorous defense of discretion in
admissions “was far more than an expression of their rather
recent commitment to racial and ethnic minorities; it was also a
self-conscious attempt to defend the discretion that permitted them
to favor key constituencies—some of them relatively weak in

70. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
71. Karabel made this point in his analysis of the response of the elite schools to the
attacks on their use of affirmative action:
The decision by elite private universities to intervene in Bakke was far more
than an expression of their rather recent commitment to racial and ethnic
minorities; it was also a self-conscious attempt to defend the discretion that
permitted them to favor key constituencies—some of them relatively weak in
academic merit—whom it wished to admit for institutional reasons.
KARABEL, supra note 10, at 492.
72. Id. at 488.
73. Id. at 488–89 (emphasis added).
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academic merit—whom it wished to admit for institutional
reasons.”74 Despite Cox’s lofty rhetoric, the actual commentary in
admissions files suggested that the reality was less exalted and
likely did not influence “vitality” or the “intellectual experience”
much. Karabel quotes comments from Harvard interviews: “short
with big ears,” “coffee house intellectual type,” “offbeat, eccentric,”
“Ken is driven, almost compulsive,” “a young man with spiked
hair,” and “seems a tad frothy.”75 These hardly reveal a thoughtful
effort to maintain Harvard’s “vitality” and “quality of the
educational experience.”
Moreover, a significant part of the public relations battle
between Harvard and the plaintiffs in the recent Students for Fair
Admissions litigation concerned whether Harvard was biased in
how it rated the personalities of Asian American applicants.76
(Harvard prevailed at the district court and court of appeals levels;
the plaintiffs have petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.)77

74. Id. at 492; see also SELINGO, supra note 12, at 106 (“College admissions is a constant
balancing act, to please the bosses, as well as other constituents—faculty, coaches, alumni,
donors, and at public universities, politicians.”); id. at 111 (Schools “don’t want to lose the
ability to choose a freshman class however they like.”).
75. KARABEL, supra note 10, at 509–10; see also B. ALDEN THRESHER, COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 56 (1966) (Selective schools see subject-matter
requirements as minimum qualifications, so “the really difficult policy decisions involve
selection from a group already ‘qualified.’ The grounds on which [this] decision is made may
seem arbitrary and capricious to one observer, while to another they may seem natural
reflections of values deeply and sincerely held. In any case there are few guidelines, and the
scope for disputation is vast.”).
76. The plaintiffs argued that the personality scores were systematically lower for
Asian American applicants than for other racial and ethnic groups and that this showed bias.
See SELINGO, supra note 12, at 112 (describing plaintiffs’ claims about the subjective scores).
77. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 201199, 2021 WL 1224145 (U.S. Mar. 2021). When the applicant pool was examined purely
based on the criteria of test scores and GPAs, the admissions rate for Asian American
applicants was significantly lower than their peers with comparable objective criteria.
Harvard sends . . . recruiting letters to black, Hispanic, and Native American
students with top grades who hit at least 1100 on the combined math and verbal
SAT score (the top score is 1600). To receive such letters under similar
circumstances, Asian American men must have a combined score of 1380, and
Asian American women, a combined score of 1350.
Joan Biskupic, Harvard Trial Opens with Challenge to Recruitment Practices, CNN
(Oct. 15, 2018, 8:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/politics/harvard-affirmativeaction-opening-arguments/index.html. Despite high scores, the Asian American applicants
had the lowest acceptance rate of any racial group. Avi-Yonah & McCafferty, supra note 7.
Collin Binkley, Appeals Court Clears Harvard of Racial Bias in Admissions, AP NEWS
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What is relevant here is not whether Harvard was discriminating
but that it thought that a subjective assessment of “personality”
was a reasonable factor to be a major criterion for admission. In
employment discrimination litigation, this would not get past a
competent defense attorney and would likely lead to an immediate
surrender to an individual plaintiff or the EEOC.78 Heavy reliance
on subjective factors delegates almost unreviewable discretion and
untraceable power to the admissions office, leaving boards reliant
on overall class statistics. Outside higher education, reliance on a
similarly subjective component in, for example, hiring employees
would be virtually unthinkable today at any business large enough
to consult employment law attorneys or HR consultants.79 Indeed,
the most important trends in employment best practices today
focus on getting subjectivity out of the process while achieving
quality hires.80
In preserving highly discretionary areas of its admissions
process, such as the athletic preferences, Harvard (and other
schools) opens the process to manipulation. Indeed, we argue that
these schools deliberately sought to make their admissions process
capable of being manipulated. The Varsity Blues schools just
(Nov. 12, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/appeals-court-clears-harvard-racial-bias4e3eb42d20ee675887e02bcec57ab412.
78. The advice provided by the “HR Hero Line” through a 2010 newsletter
characterizes the view of subjective factors: “Most employers understand that they should
discourage the use of subjective criteria to make hiring, advancement, and severance
decisions.” North Dakota Employment Law Letter, Making ‘Subjective’ Employment Criteria
‘Objective’, HR DAILY ADVISOR (Dec. 9, 2010), https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/
2010/12/09/making-subjective-employment-criteria-objective/. The newsletter concludes
by advising,
Don’t allow managers and supervisors in your organization to whine that
subjectivity is critical to evaluating an employee’s performance. To the contrary,
terms such as “attitude,” “reliability,” “initiative,” and “team player” need remain
subjective only if a manager is simply too lazy to identify the objective
performance criteria that can be used to measure the “subjective” categories he
wants to evaluate.
Id. We do not think the people behind opaque admissions processes are lazy; the problem is,
as we describe below, that they are focused on maximizing the payoffs to internal
constituencies.
79. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 744–45 (2005).
80. Employers search for ways to minimize such problems while attempting to
increase diversity as noted in Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the Diversity Problem in the
Tech Industry? Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-Making, 22 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 290 (2019).
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wanted that ability for their own admissions staffs rather than Rick
Singer.81 It was Singer’s understanding of the combination of a
discretionary process, its opacity, and its incentives that gave him
the opportunity to manipulate the process on behalf of his clients.
If elite institutions wish to preserve subjective procedures in
pursuit of “vitality,” it is not unreasonable to require them to also
create processes that prevent abuses, just as we require financial
institutions to develop safeguards against other forms of
corruption or corporations generally to implement anti-money
laundering and other compliance programs. Indeed, the federal
government already requires universities to undertake multiple,
burdensome compliance programs in many areas, from Title IX82 to
the Cleary Act83 to the Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act.84
C. Implications of Fabrications in Pursuit of Rankings for Admissions
As rankings have assumed a greater importance in higher
education,85 scandals at several prestigious universities revealed
significant cheating in efforts to gain higher rankings.86 Some brief
examples illustrate the problem. In 2011 the University of Illinois
College of Law admitted to the American Bar Association that it
had inaccurately reported admissions statistics (students’ LSAT
and undergraduate GPAs) over six years, blaming the problem on
81. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 116 (“[L]egal challenges and political debates have
turned admissions deans into Rube Goldbergs, forced to build increasingly intricate systems
to take into account ever more factors. They may wish for an easier and less convoluted
selection process, but the contraption they have designed has too many overlapping and
incompatible parts to work efficiently. The mechanism may ultimately serve the interests of
their institutions, but a convenient by-product is a vague process that keeps applicants in
the dark.”).
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
83. Id. § 1092f.
84. Id. § 1232g.
85. See ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA GOLDBERG, CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID 1955–1994, at 71 (1998) (“Where a college ended up in the
rankings could strongly affect its admissions performance. In 1984, after Amherst was
ranked the number one national liberal arts college, Dean Bedford ordered 25,000 copies of
the U.S. News Report and sent them to applicants all over the country. In 1990/91, applicants
to the College of the Holy Cross dropped 11 percent from the previous year [after a fall in
rankings]. At the same time, the quality of the students who chose to enroll fell precipitously.
Admissions officials attributed these declines to national rankings.”).
86. See WENDY NELSON ESPELAND & MICHAEL SAUDER, ENGINES OF ANXIETY:
ACADEMIC RANKINGS, REPUTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2016) (“This pressure to
produce the best numbers possible also motivates those in charge of the numbers to cheat.”).
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a rogue admissions dean and a lack of adequate controls over the
rogue employee’s reporting of numbers at the law school.87 Temple
University’s business school provided false admissions data for at
least 2014–18 that led to higher rankings for its MBA programs. The
investigation blamed the business school dean and unspecified
underlings, who, it concluded, had inadequate controls on the data
and had dismantled existing controls.88 After the Temple data
scandal, eight other business schools were discovered to have also
submitted inaccurate data in pursuit of higher rankings.89
Some rankings scandals involve submission of data about other
areas as well. In 2018, the IE Business School was dropped from the
Financial Times rankings for submitting inaccurate data, which the
school blamed on lower level staff while expressing “full support
and confidence” in the dean.90 The University of Oklahoma
admitted twenty years of submitting incorrect data to U.S. News in
spring 2019.91 Later that year, U.S. News removed the University of
California, Berkeley and four other schools from its 2019 ranking
for providing inaccurate data that inflated their rankings.92 Less
egregious, but perhaps even more troubling, another study
coauthored by one of this Article’s authors found that law schools
that created part-time programs gained a rankings edge during the
period that U.S. News did not count part-time students’ grades and
87. Mark Hansen, U of Illinois Law School Admits to Six years of False LSAT/GPA
Data, ABA J. (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:21 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
illinois_law_admits_to_six_years_of_false_lsat_gpa_data. Full disclosure: one author (Morriss)
was on the UIUC faculty during part of the period when this was occurring. He played no
role in admissions.
88. Findings and Recommendations from Jones Day Investigation into Rankings Information
Provided by Fox School to U.S. News, https://news.temple.edu/sites/news/files/images/
findings_and_recommendations.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
89. Sara Hoover, After Temple Scandal, More Colleges Misreport Data, Stripped of U.S.
News Rankings, WHYY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/after-temple-scandalmore-colleges-misreport-data-stripped-of-u-s-news-rankings/.
90. John A. Bryne, Heads Roll at IE Over Loss of FT Ranking, POETS & QUANTS (Feb. 5,
2018), https://poetsandquants.com/2018/02/05/heads-roll-at-ie-over-loss-of-ft-ranking/
?pq-category=business-school-news&amp;pq-category-2=international-business-school-news.
91. Eric Levenson, University of Oklahoma Gave False Data to U.S. News College Rankings
for 20 Years, CNN, (May 24, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/23/
us/university-oklahoma-best-colleges-ranking/index.html.
92. Robert Morse, Matt Mason & Eric Brooks, Updates to 5 Schools’ 2019 Best Colleges
Rankings Data, U.S. NEWS (July 25, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/
education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/articles/2019-07-25/updates-to-5-schools-2019best-colleges-rankings-data.
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LSAT scores in calculating its rankings. The authors interpreted this
as evidence of gaming the system.93
There are four important implications of these episodes for
our purposes. First, the extraordinary lengths to which university
personnel are willing to go in seeking advantages and the
willingness of some administrators to engage in dishonest behavior
should be sufficient to put college and university boards on notice
that admissions (and reporting data on admissions) is not
something that can be left to the staff but an area that demands
systematic oversight. Note that these problems occurred at
“reputable” schools, including flagship state universities and
well-regarded private ones.
Second, the ease with which efforts to rig admissions data
succeeded (for a time) at multiple schools shows that controls are
lacking. In each data misrepresentation case noted above, the
university involved blamed rogue administrators and a lack of
sufficient compliance infrastructure. Despite the history of such
problems in higher education, Temple University had even allowed
its “rogue” dean to dismantle the rather minimal checks and
balances it had in place. Moreover, as one of us has discovered in
his practice, when there is one type of fraud present in an
organization there is often more fraud as well.
Third, these examples illustrate the problem of bad incentive
structures within colleges and universities. Illinois blamed its
problem on the admission dean’s desire for advancement (and he
did indeed advance before he was caught, significantly increasing
his salary); Temple’s dean was attempting to improve his
reputation by advancing the school’s ranking. Similar motives
likely existed in the other cases. The incentives in these cases are
similar in kind to the sales force incentive structure at issue in
Caremark, where the court found that a corporate board should
have understood the regulatory compliance problem that company
policies on compliance created.94 More recently, the Delaware
Supreme Court allowed claims against Blue Bell Creameries USA,
Inc.’s directors where the plaintiffs alleged that the board had no
committee overseeing food safety, no board-level process to

93. William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT
Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163 (2006).
94. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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address food safety, and no protocol for informing the board of
food safety reports or developments.95 Shareholders seeking
compensation for a food company’s failure to address food safety
at the board level could pursue their claims. Similarly, Boeing
shareholders are currently suing that company’s board for lax
supervision of safety issues concerning the 737MAX.96 Admissions
is as central to universities’ business as food safety is to an ice cream
maker or aircraft safety is to a plane manufacturer. Caremark, as we
discuss below, imposed liability on Delaware corporate board
members personally for failing to adequately oversee business
practices analogous to those uncovered in Varsity Blues. Why are
university and college boards not held to the same standard?
Finally, falsifying admission data to game the system is a fraud,
just like falsifying inventory, revenue, or water quality test results.
Ignoring this at colleges indicates a more laissez-faire approach to
the application of rules and regulations than is appropriate. It is
time for law enforcement to pay attention to such fraud.
***
We now turn to a more in-depth look at college admissions as
an example of the nonmarket allocation of scarce goods.
II. NONMARKET ALLOCATION OF SCARCE GOODS
Markets allocate scarce goods through the price mechanism. If
the demand for a good exceeds supply, prices rise. This usually
leads to additional supply of the good as existing suppliers expand
production and new suppliers enter the market. Such reactions can
take time and until supply increases, existing suppliers may earn
additional profits by allocating the goods to those willing to pay the
most. This produces an “efficient” result, in the sense that the goods
are matched to the buyers with the highest valuation (subject to
being able to fund the purchase).97 There are factors, such as when
long-term contracts are involved or the availability of credit for
those wishing to bid more than their assets allow, that complicate

95. Marchand, supra note 21, at 809.
96. Andrew Tangel & Andy Pasztor, Boeing Board Accused in Lawsuit of Lax Oversight
During 737 MAX Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2020, 4:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/boeing-board-accused-in-lawsuit-of-lax-oversight-during-737-max-crisis-11601054531.
97. See AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, STEVEN LEVITT & CHAD SYVERSON, MICROECONOMICS 595
(2d ed. 2016).
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the process,98 but the crucial point is that markets generally operate
based on a willingness to pay and movements in prices create
signals about the relative desirability of goods that lead to changes
by both consumers and producers.99 Market distribution works so
well that quasi-markets often spring up in seemingly unlikely
places (POW camps, prisons, socialist economies).100 If price is
removed as the means of distribution of scarce goods, some
alternative is necessary. Potential mechanisms include lotteries,101
force (as within a criminal enterprise),102 requiring other resource
expenditures (homesteading),103 queuing (as in the former Soviet
Union),104 and administrative allocation (such as the wireless
spectrum).105
Nonmarket decisions about the allocations of goods, including
college admissions, could be done in a manner most would
consider to be fair. Consider this account of how a legitimate
college admissions consultant describes what most would agree
would be a fair admissions process:
Your grades will matter, and colleges like to see As and Bs
regardless of your class level. It is important prioritize your grade
point average and class rank and make certain that the difficulty
of a class will not prevent you from achieving good test grades.
Make sure you can handle the work you sign up for . . . . Many
private schools are looking to see evidence that you took a
challenging high school curriculum. They will look at your grades

98. Id. at 606.
99. Id. at 22–24.
100. The classic article on point is R.A. Radford, The Economic Organization of a P.O.W.
Camp, 12 ECONOMICA 189 (1945). See also Stephen Lankenau, Smoke ‘Em If You Got ‘Em:
Cigarette Black Markets in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 81 PRISON J. 142 (2001); Michael V. Alexeev,
The Underground Market for Gasoline in the USSR, 30 COMPAR. ECON. STUD. 47 (1988).
101. John R. Boyce, Allocation of Goods by Lottery, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 457 (1994).
102. H. Richard Friman, Drug Markets and the Selective Use of Violence, 52 CRIME L. &
SOC. CHANGE 285 (2009).
103. Richard Stroup, Buying Misery with Federal Land, 57 PUB. CHOICE 69 (1988).
104. Michael Alexeev, Microeconomic Modeling of Parallel Markets: The Case of Agricultural
Goods in the USSR, 11 J. COMPAR. ECON. 543 (1987).
105. See generally THOMAS WINSLOW HAZLETT, THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM: THE
TUMULTUOUS LIBERATION OF WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY, FROM HERBERT HOOVER TO THE
SMARTPHONE (2017).
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for each in high
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The problem is that Singer (and presumably others like him) are
able to manipulate the process due to the lack of control by
universities over their admissions programs.
There are plenty of fair nonmarket allocations of scarce goods.
For example, places in medical residencies are allocated through a
complex matching process in which both applicants and residency
programs rank each other, and an algorithm is applied to maximize
the “fit” between applicants’ and institutions’ preferences.107 In
2020, this process had 40,084 applicants seeking placement into a
total of 37,256 positions. The National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) initially filled 35,258 positions in its first round and then
an additional 1,586 through a supplemental match, giving an
106. JILL MADENBERG & AMANDA MADENBERG, LOVE THE JOURNEY TO COLLEGE:
GUIDANCE FROM AN ADMISSIONS CONSULTANT AND HER DAUGHTER 15 (2017). The
Madenbergs offer a list of what colleges consider that reflect what most people would think
described an honest (if perhaps biased toward people wealthy enough to afford hiring
someone like Ms. Madenberg) process: academics (rigor of high school record, class rank,
academic GPA, standardized test scores, essays, recommendations), nonacademic (personal
qualities/characteristics), interviews, extracurricular activities, talent/ability, first
generation status, alumni relations, geographical residence, racial/ethnic status, volunteer
work, work experience, demonstrated interest, and social networking. Id. at 84–93. Their
advice does not differ significantly from Singer’s in his admissions book, Getting In:
To the admissions committee, you start out as a cow. You’re just like all the other
cows. Your job is to show them that you’re not just any cow—you’re a Bar W cow
(whatever that means). Maybe Bar W cows are only of the Short Horn Waguyu
Breed, fed on organic open-range grass, without growth hormones but sprinkled
with pixie dust. That’s what branding means. You can sum up all your unique
qualities (like academic ability, artistic talent, or passion for helping others) in a
few words and images that tell them exactly who you are and what you are about.
You can tell your story, and live a life that supports it. The students who stand out
are the ones who get in. You can stand out from the herd. This book will show you
how.
RICK SINGER, GETTING IN: PERSONAL BRANDS 7 (2014). Most of Singer’s advice is
straightforward (“Keep your hair neatly trimmed, bathe regularly, wear clean and well-kept
clothes, and stand up straight.”) Id. at 34. Interestingly, he did note that a “public arrest
record” was the type of mistake “legends can’t hide.” In those circumstances, Singer advised
prospective college students to “own” their mistakes. Id. at 54. It may be, however, that
admissions offices do not actually have a clear definition of what makes a good applicant.
THRESHER, supra note 75, at 63 (“Recruiting implies that one knows a good candidate when
one sees him. The judgments involved in this process are heavily loaded with personal and
class predilections, prejudices, and assumptions, all held with such conviction that they
seem, to the holder, to be self-evident truths or laws of nature.”).
107. See Alvin E. Roth, The Origins, History and Design of the Resident Match, 289 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 909 (2003).
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overall “fill rate” of ninety-nine percent.108 While not free of
problems,109 the NRMP is widely believed to be a successful
example of a transparent administrative allocation of scarce
goods.110 Similarly, China allocates university positions through a
competitive national examination process (“probably the largest
centralized matching system in the world”),111 although the fairness
of the process has been questioned.112
What distinguishes an honest administrative allocation process
from one where corruption is a problem? We argue that when three
factors are all present, administrative processes are more
vulnerable to corruption. First, the greater the scarcity of the good
allocated, the more likely it is for someone to want to circumvent
the process through corruption. If 99 out of a 100 people will be
allocated the good, the incentive to make an end run is relatively
low compared with when only 10 out of 100 will receive the good.
Second, when the process is opaque, participants will be more
likely to invest resources in seeking an end run. Not only will they
not necessarily know how to succeed honestly in the process, and
so be inclined to look for alternatives, they will have little faith in
the fairness of a process they do not understand and be unwilling
to accept the results: “Trust us, you aren’t worthy” is a difficult
message to sell. Together, shortages and opaqueness create a
demand for alternatives including corruption. Third, the absence of
meaningful oversight of the process to limit abuse of discretion
lowers the risk and cost of engaging in corruption for those
operating the process. As a result, they will be more willing to
engage in corruption. It thus enables the supply of corrupted
108. National Resident Matching Program, Results and Data: 2020 Main Residency Match
(May 2020), https://mk0nrmp3oyqui6wqfm.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/MM_Results_and-Data_2020.pdf.
109. Kathleen Crapanzano & Bilal Ahmad, We Must Prevent Fraud in the Residency
Recruitment and Match Process, 94 ACAD. MED. 155 (Feb. 2019), https://journals.lww.com/
academicmedicine/Fulltext/2019/02000/We_Must_Prevent_Fraud_in_the_Residency_Rec
ruitment.10.aspx.
110. Binzhen Wu & Xiaohan Zhong, Fairness of the Boston Matching Mechanism in China’s
College Admissions (Dec. 1, 2016), at 1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2902729 (“China, as well as many other countries, have long used centralized admissions
systems, which have been widely believed to be able to improve fairness.”).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Yiqin Fu, China’s Unfair College Admission System, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/chinas-unfair-college-admissionssystem/276995/.
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mechanisms. Together these three criteria parsimoniously account
for the demand for the scarce good, the incentive to supply it, and
the opportunity to circumvent formal processes. We now review
these criteria with respect to college admissions.
A. Significant Scarcity
Competition across colleges to attract students and tuition
revenue is strong and may be becoming even tougher.113 The
National Center for Education Statistics reports that as of 2017–18
there were 750 public four-year degree-granting colleges and 1,590
private nonprofit four-year colleges.114 In 2017–18, 12,133,000
full-time students enrolled in four-year colleges. Eliminating the
approximately 1.098 million at for-profit colleges and dividing total
enrollment by four (and so overestimating freshman enrollment,
since some students take longer to finish), there were
approximately 2,758 million first-time students in four-year degree
granting schools, roughly three-quarters in public institutions and
one-quarter in private nonprofit colleges.115
Admission to a four-year college is not a scarce good;116 many
schools are desperate for paying customers to fill their classes.117
113. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 12 (“[I]t’s actually never been easier to get into college.”).
114. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: 2019
tbl.105.50, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/2019menu_tables.asp.
115. Id.
116. Many four-year colleges will admit nearly anyone with a high school diploma.
Two-year colleges admit almost everyone. See Digest of Education Statistics, supra note 114, at
tbl.305.40. Completion at those schools generally guarantees admission to a four-year school.
For first-year students applying to four-year schools, there are many schools easy to get into.
In Michigan, for 2017–18, the University of Michigan took only 23 percent of applicants,
followed by Grace Bible College, but Michigan State University took 78 percent and Western
Michigan University took 81 percent. See Collegesimply, Michigan Colleges Rank by Lowest
Acceptance Rate, https://www.collegesimply.com/colleges/rank/colleges/
lowest-acceptance-rate/state/michigan/. Some of the authors know from personal
experience that schools can increase their “selectivity” score by declaring that first-year
students who attend but did not meet the official admission standards are on “probation”
and so are not counted as admitted. If they pass courses in their first year, then they become
regular students. Colleges play many games to increase their ranking scores, especially the
one from USNEWS, one of the most commonly cited ranking sources.
117. This is particularly true in 2020, as the uncertainties created by COVID have had
an impact on college applications. See Jessica Dickler, College Acceptance Rates May Go Higher
as Schools Start Aggressively Courting Applicants, CNBC (May 12, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/12/college-acceptance-rates-rise-nearly-across-the-boardamid-coronavirus.html.
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Even without taking into account the COVID-19 related
uncertainties, this situation will worsen (from colleges’ point of
view) and improve (from applicants’ point of view) as the
demographics of the U.S. population shift, with fewer high
school-age graduates who could apply to college in the future.118
In some states, the number of high school graduates are falling
more than ten percent from 2008–09 to 2021–22.119
Admission to the subset of selective institutions is a scarce
good, however.120 U.S. News & World Report’s list of the schools with
the lowest acceptance rates includes schools admitting from four
percent (Stanford and Harvard) to thirty-one percent (Brandeis
University, California State University-Long Beach, Milwaukee
Institute of Art and Design, and Smith College).121 Scarcity benefits
institutions by helping promote an exclusive image, facilitating
educational signaling, and adding to the prestige of institutions.122
118. The number of people age 15–19 will fall between 2020 to 2030. Statista, Population
Projections for the United States from 2015 to 2060, at https://www.statista.com/
statistics/611644/united-states-population-projection-by-age/.
119. National Center for Education Statistics, Projections of Education Statistics to 2021
tbl. 15, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/tables.asp. That
includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan, and Ohio. Id.
120. Selingo estimates that less than ten percent of schools are what he terms “sellers,”
schools that can afford to be selective. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 50. However, from the
applicant’s point of view, admission to a particular school could be desirable because the
school offered:
• a better education (leaving the definition of “better” undefined for now);
• a better alumni network, providing improved post-graduation opportunities;
• a better collegiate experience (a winning football team, nicer facilities, more
exclusive social life); and/or
• a better signal to future employers.
For these reasons (and others, such as location or availability of a desired degree program),
applicants view some schools as preferable to others. The 200 most selective schools each
admit under half their applicants. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 39. The most selective schools
account for a third of all applications, even though they are just twenty percent of the colleges
and universities. Id. This has long been true. KATHERINE KINKEAD, HOW AN IVY LEAGUE
COLLEGE DECIDES ON ADMISSIONS 6 (1961) (noting Yale had more than three applicants for
each place in the late 1950s).
121. U.S. News, Top 100—Lowest Acceptance Rates, https://www.usnews.com/bestcolleges/rankings/lowest-acceptance-rate (last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (using 2018 entering
class data).
122. See, e.g., Madenberg & Madenberg, supra note 106, at 52 (“The first thing you need
to understand is that the single most important statistic to a college is its Yield number.”);
Duffy & Goldberg, supra note 85, at 69 (“The hierarchy among the colleges reflected in admit
rates, applications per enrolled student, and overall admissions situations reflects an
increasing concern with status and prestige.”).
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[S]carcity has the added benefit of increasing an institution’s
prestige. The more students who apply, and the fewer students
who get in, the more selective an institution becomes, and,
subsequently, the more prestigious. And parents are clawing over
one another to get a taste of the social capital that comes with
that.123

There is thus significant scarcity—and reasons for institutions to
maintain it—in part of U.S. higher education.124 Indeed, scarcity
grew in the 1990s as schools launched efforts to recruit more
applicants to make themselves appear more selective.125
Desirability and scarcity increase the intensity of the demand for
the allocated good and encourages an environment where side
agreements can be crafted.
Varsity Blues fits this description. Acceptance rates at the
colleges and universities targeted by Singer and his clients were

123. Adam Harris, One Way to Stop College-Admission Insanity: Admit More, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/03/stop-collegeadmission-cheating-admit-more-students/584749/. Selingo notes that parents seek elite
educations for their children in part out of a sense of economic insecurity. Selingo, supra note
12, at 7 (“For well-off and middle-class parents, their economic state is a precarious position
to be preserved for their children.”).
124. Note that greater scarcity alone does not suffice to open the doors wide to
corruption. Despite medical residency slots in more desirable locations (with opportunities
for training with a star staff, live in a high quality of life area, and so on) being fiercely sought
by highly competitive medical school graduates, the matching system has avoided
corruption issues. Selectivity has increased since the 1990s. Selingo provides several
examples, comparing 1990 and current numbers for Washington University (62% vs. 14%),
the University of Pennsylvania (38% vs. 9%), and Johns Hopkins University (53% vs. 11%).
Selingo, supra note 12, at 9. See also JACQUES STEINBERG, THE GATEKEEPERS: INSIDE THE
ADMISSIONS PROCESS OF A PREMIER COLLEGE 6–7 (2002) (“Other than those fortunate enough
to be accepted, the most immediate beneficiaries of all this wooing would be Wesleyan’s
professors. Like gardeners, the university’s faculty members needed fertile minds in which
to plant the seeds of knowledge, and when they weren’t satisfied with the quality in a given
year—if there were too few Russian majors or not enough budding microbiologists, for
example—the professors were never shy about telling the administration. Also paying close
attention to Ralph’s [the admissions director] efforts were the university’s alumni, who were
particularly gratified when Wesleyan snagged a hot prospect—academic, as well as
athletic—from a competitor. That swelling pride was often all it took to nudge a willing
alumnus to contribute upward of a million dollars to his alma mater, which in turn made it
possible for the institution to seek to attract even better applicants.”); Duffy & Goldberg,
supra note 85, at 32 (“Self-studies and strategic plans from the 1990s, like those from the 1980s,
are peppered with references to the size/quality trade-off . . . . In the short term, some of the
colleges in our study have been willing to weather budgetary pressures in order to preserve
their academic standards.”).
125. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 72–73.
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among the most selective. Singer’s clients’ children may not have
had the credentials (or their parents feared they did not) to gain
admissions even if they had objectively high credentials or the
accoutrements of celebrity that normally open doors.
B. Opacity
Opacity is a critical element in enabling corruption, a source of
the common claim that “[s]unlight is the best disinfectant.”126 Many
anti-corruption efforts rely on transparency as a means to expose
existing corruption and, hopefully, to forestall it.127 Opacity
facilitates corruption by allowing corrupt behavior to go unnoticed
by the press and the public. Particularly for allocation of prestige
goods, such as higher education, it is critical that the process of
selection not be perceived as corrupt.128 To date, keeping as much
as possible behind closed doors helps keep the focus on ivy-covered
walls and successful alumni. And U.S. higher education’s opacity
is remarkable compared with higher education in other countries.
Prof. Jerome Karabel’s in-depth study of Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton’s admissions policies over time begins by announcing
that “viewed from both a historical and a comparative perspective,
the admission practices of America’s top colleges and universities
are exceedingly strange.”129 Jeffrey Selingo similarly concluded in
his account of admissions that “[t]he more selective the institution,
the murkier its process often is.”130 Similarly, Jacques Steinberg
126. Justice Brandeis actually said, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”
LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1914).
127. Transparency International is the most prominent NGO to expose corruption. For
an overview, see What Is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
en/what-is-corruption (last visited Oct. 6, 2021). Some corruption probes are spectacular,
such as Operation Car Wash in Brazil that took down numerous top government leaders. See
Anderson Cooper, Brazil’s “Operation Car Wash” Involves Billions in Bribes, Scores of Politicians,
CBS NEWS (May 21, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brazil-operation-car-washinvolves-billions-in-bribes-scores-of-politicians/. Transparency International’s data
(available on its website) suggests corruption is common globally. Numerous stories are
reported at the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project available at
https://www.occrp.org/en/.
128. See Niro Sivanathan & Nathan C. Pettit, Protecting the Self Through Consumption:
Status Goods as Affirmational Commodities, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 564 (2010). The
authors review several studies on “self-integrity” involved in obtaining high-status goods.
129. KARABEL, supra note 10, at 1.
130. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 86. Selingo is former editor of the CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION and a professor at Arizona State University. See also Kinkead, supra note 120, at
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noted that “Colleges make their admissions decisions behind a
cordon of security befitting the selection of a pope. The reasons why
one applicant was accepted, while another was rejected, are closely
held by the few people permitted in the room at the time the choices
are made.”131
College applicants seeking to obtain admission to their top
choice are poorly equipped to be careful consumers.132 Among
other things, few explicitly consider cost in deciding where to
apply.133 Most families choose a college for a family member only
once per child.134 Parents who are themselves college graduates
have been students at only a handful of institutions at most and
perhaps at only one, and their experiences are many years past.135
As a result, higher education is a market dominated by first time
buyers (applicants), advised by family members and friends whose
own college experiences may be decades out of date. Such
information comes mostly from other infrequent purchasers of

6 (“To a thoughtful outsider, the spectacle of the Yale admissions procedure is a heartening
one. For in spite of the hundreds of qualifying youngsters applying. Yale’s selection remains
an individual and personal process.”).
131. STEINBERG, supra note 124, at ix.
132. Selingo’s account of a year spent with the admissions staff at Emory, Davidson,
and the University of Washington enabled him to describe aspects of admissions that few
outside higher education understand, such as the “shaping” of a class, a process that means
“for a tiny slice of applicants there isn’t just one look, but many.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at
2. Even with multiple looks, however, files have to be dealt with quickly. He notes that the
longest the admissions team spent on a file while he sat with them on one day was twelve
minutes. Id. at 4. Elsewhere, Selingo notes that “[t]he fate of most students is sealed in the
first evaluation of their materials” which takes five to ten minutes. Id. at 182.
133. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 33; see also CAITLIN ZALOOM, INDEBTED: HOW FAMILIES
MAKE COLLEGE WORK AT ANY COST 61 (2019) (discussing a family who sent their son to a
“selective private college in the Northeast” for a liberal arts program, which they saw as “a
gift to their child who had always been so dedicated to both his sports and his studies,”
despite serious financial pressure); id. at 112 (discussing a student who persuades her parents
that despite financial issues she should go to Princeton by saying, “‘If I go here I’m going to
get this amazing Ivy League education and I’m going to be able to do whatever I want with
it.’ How could they argue with that?”).
134. Selingo classifies college as an experience good, that is one whose quality can only
be judged by actually experiencing it. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 55. We think applicants
could be much better consumers but agree with Selingo that the incentive structure does not
encourage investing in learning about the process.
135. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 229 (“The parents of today’s teenagers didn’t encounter
the price competition between schools when they applied to college, and thus they largely
underestimate it, to their disadvantage.”).
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higher education.136 This aspect of the market is what allowed Rick
Singer to prosper as a legitimate college application coach before
he turned to criminal methods. There is a robust market in
concierge-like help with admissions, ranging from guidebooks and
test preparation courses to advisors who help fill out application
materials and brief applicants on what to say at interviews.137
Inexperienced potential buyers confront a process at elite
institutions that is willfully obscure.138 Beyond high school
transcripts and test scores, applicants and their families know little
about how it operates. We say it is willfully obscure because
colleges and universities, particularly highly selective ones, do little
to dispel the mystery surrounding the admissions process.139 For
example, Harvard’s statement on its admissions page is remarkably
vague:
We seek promising students who will contribute to the
Harvard community during their college years, and to society
throughout their lives.

136. There are small signs of hope that technology may help disrupt the admissions
process. Naviance is a software platform that helps students match their objective credentials
against colleges’ records in accepting students like them. Madenberg & Madenberg, supra
note 106, at 114–15. Of course, it doesn’t include data on how much other applicants’ parents
paid coaches to get their child designated as an athlete. See also SELINGO, supra note 12, at 230
(describing TuitionFit and Edmit, which crowdsource data to allow applicants to compare
aid offers).
137. An online search provides links to many college admission advisors with glowing
testimonials from happy Ivy League students they assert to have helped. See, e.g., Find a
College Application Professional Near You, THUMBTACK, https://www.thumbtack.com/k/
college-application-assistance/near-me/?irgwc=1&utm_campaign=impact27795&utm_content
=Wlywm5WpsxyLUh8wUx0Mo37BUkBTwP0fU2koz40&utm_medium=affiliate&utm_sou
rce=cma-affiliate (last visited Oct. 6, 2021); Madenberg & Madenberg, supra note 106.
138. Selingo charitably describes admissions as a “holistic process based on a
complicated rating system.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at xii.
139. Selingo argues that it is fruitless to bemoan “the lack of precise signals and
information for both the applicant and the school to make timely and knowledgeable
decisions.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at 10. For example, consider Wesleyan’s use of “numerical
ratings to applicants in amorphous categories like ‘commitment’ and ‘intellectual curiosity.’”
STEINBERG, supra note 124, at xxi. These practices have a long history. Duffy & Goldberg,
supra note 85, at 84 (quoting Harvard institutional research director in 1970 that “[f]or the
Classes of ‘59, ‘64, ‘66, ‘68 the weight of the personal attributes factor increased markedly.
During this ten-year period the number of applicants more than doubled and the SAT scores
of the applicant group increased more than a hundred points. Hence the committee had
much more freedom in the decision process and it chose to give more weight to the personal
strengths of the students.”).
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While academic accomplishment is important, the Admissions
Committee considers many other factors—strong personal
qualities, special talents or excellences of all kinds, perspectives
formed by unusual personal circumstances, and the ability to take
advantage of available resources and opportunities.140

Stanford’s and Princeton’s explanation of their admissions process
are similarly opaque:
At Stanford, we practice holistic admission. Each piece in an
application is part of an integrated and comprehensive whole.
One piece tells us about your background and life experiences,
another about your school, and your academic achievement. We
learn from others about your character and intellectual
contributions. In your essays, we learn about your ideas and
interests, and what is meaningful to you.
....
In a holistic review, we seek to understand how you, as a whole
person, would grow, contribute, and thrive at Stanford, and how
Stanford would, in turn, be changed by you.141
The [Princeton] University’s admission process involves a
holistic review of each applicant’s entire file. No particular factor
is assigned a fixed weight; rather, the process involves a highly
individualized assessment of the applicant’s talents,
achievements, and his or her potential to contribute to learning at
Princeton.142

Indeed, universities sometimes admit that their processes are not
even consistent. Douglas Bennet, president of Wesleyan, responded
to a complaint about admissions by explaining that, as Steinberg
summarized,
admissions was a process in which the objective criteria were
always changing, depending on the particular candidate and the
institution’s specific need at that moment. In these two cases, the
committee’s stated goal of being consistent within the same high

140. First-Year Applicants, HARV. UNIV. https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/
apply/first-year-applicants (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
141. Our Selection Process, STAN. UNIV. https://admission.stanford.edu/apply/
selection/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
142. How to Apply, PRINCETON UNIV., https://admission.princeton.edu/how-apply
(last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
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school was outweighed, at least in part, by other concerns: the
sliding grades and limited extracurricular interests of one
applicant, and the risk of alienating the family of another. Such
calculations become even more complicated when the objective of
diversity was introduced into the mix.143

It is not just the most academically selective schools that
describe their admissions methodologies in such vague terms. The
University of Southern California, a school for which a number of
Varsity Blues defendants sought Singer’s help in their children’s
applications, does as well:
We look for those students we believe will thrive at USC. Our
application process is designed to discover your individual story,
so that we might see how you would take advantage of the many
opportunities available at USC. Like many highly selective
universities, we conduct a comprehensive, holistic review of your
application to consider academic and personal characteristics. We
will review your performance in school, the rigor of your
program, writing skills and test scores. We also consider personal
qualities, as revealed in community involvement, leadership and
achievements.144

Faced with such confusing descriptions and a lack of clear criteria,
it is little wonder that many applicants and their families seek
outside help.145 The information parents have about top schools is
that they are difficult to get into and there is no fixed formula.146
Why do schools use such vague descriptions of their
admissions processes? A “holistic” approach to university
admissions is appealing to multiple constituencies within elite
institutions. It gives applicants hope that even if they lack the
143. STEINBERG, supra note 124, at 100–01.
144. Apply: What We Look For, UNIV. OF S. CAL., https://admission.usc.edu/apply/ouradmission-process/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
145. STEINBERG, supra note 124, at xv (“Like well-paid psychologists, college
consultants also began hanging out their shingles, offering to give middle-class students at
public high schools the sort of strategic edge that previously had been reserved for students
at elite private schools.”).
146. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 10 (“The cloak of ‘holistic admissions,’ a procedure that
considers factors beyond grades and test scores is nearly ubiquitous among selective
schools.”); see Thresher, supra note 75, at 21 (“The selection principle raises deeper social and
educational issues about which most people have strong views but little real knowledge.
Each college is busy selecting among applicants—some very vigorously select a minority of
applicants in, others rather loosely select a minority out.”).
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highest grades or test scores, they nonetheless have a chance to get
into top schools.147 That has the benefit of increasing applications
for the schools, which contributes to the school’s brand by lowering
their acceptance rate, thus boosting their exclusivity. Selectivity is
a component of many college ranking systems.148 It also gives
admissions departments greater opportunities to shape the
incoming class to meet their preferences.149 It offers administrators
ways to ease the delivery of bad news about admissions to
applicants and families complaining about the failure of an
applicant to gain admission, and it allows the administration to
shape freshman classes to meet the demands of competing
stakeholders (alumni, faculty, and other constituencies).150 As
Karabel notes, these admission processes appear “strange” to most
of the world:
147. Applicants and their families “want a formula. . . . They want this transparency
until they find out that they don’t have the right grades and test scores to get in. That’s when
they favor a process that considers the ‘whole person,’ one including what they think are
their best attributes.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at 87; see also Kinkead, supra note 120, at 7
(“Unfortunately there is a trend today toward judging college candidates from paper data—
from the results of multiple-choice tests whose answers are written out in the questions
themselves and which permit the elements of personality, of creativity, and of individual
talents little chance of showing through—and from school records and teacher resumés predigested for admissions officers by the secondary-school guidance men.”).
148. CATHY N. DAVIDSON, THE NEW EDUCATION: HOW TO REVOLUTIONIZE THE
UNIVERSITY TO PREPARE STUDENTS FOR A WORLD IN FLUX 213–14 (2017) (“One criterion
underlies all of the others: selectivity. And, for most institutions, selectivity is based on
grades and test scores of individual students.”). Rankings are important, even to elite
schools. Id. at 49 (“The single fastest way a president can improve a university’s ranking is
to become more selective, because a chief factor in rankings is the admittance rate.”). They
are extremely important for those selling rankings. Selingo notes that college rankings are
the “linchpin of the U.S. News brand, generating 29 million unique visitors to its website in
2019.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at 77.
149. KARABEL, supra note 10, at 485–86 (“This extraordinary emphasis on highly
subjective qualities—pursued right down to the assignment of a single number reflecting the
institution’s summary assessment of the candidate as a human being—was central to the
admissions process of the Big Three. Though peculiar from the perspective of many faculty,
the system had important institutional advantages. Apart from permitting the admissions
office to act on its not unjustified belief that brains alone were a poor predictor of success
later in life, the weight given to nonacademic factors permitted gatekeepers to balance
interest groups against one another in selecting a class. To do this, they needed to protect
their autonomy and their discretion, both of which were well served by a complex
admissions process designed to be flexible, subjective, and opaque.”).
150. KINKEAD, supra note 120, at 12 (“[M]uch of the popularity of the appellations can
be traced to the way they protect a guidance man when he breaks the news to querulous
parents that their child will have to be content with admission to what he calls ‘an excellent
little liberal-arts institution,’ which the parents have never heard of.”).
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Americans, for example, accept as normal that highly subjective
qualities such as “character” and “personality” should figure
centrally in the admissions process—a policy that seemed to
many at the time it was invented to be an open invitation to
prejudice and discrimination. Americans also take for granted
that the ability to throw, kick, or hit a ball is a legitimate criterion
in determining who should be admitted to our greatest research
universities—a proposition that would be considered laughable
in most of the world’s countries. And Americans tolerate a system
in which our most selective institutions of higher education
routinely grant preferences to the children of alumni and major
donors—a practice that viewed from a distance looks
unmeritocratic at best and profoundly corrupt at worst.151

Opacity is necessary but not sufficient for corruption to take
root in an administrative allocation scheme. Without obscuring
how programs are run, administrators’ decisions can be harder to
defend, particularly where a selective institution could fill its
entering class multiple times over with equally well-objectively
credentialed applicants.152 Moreover, knowing that there is an
alumni preference or desire to limit or to expand the presence of a
particular group on campus is different from being confronted with
the reality of the tradeoffs in objective characteristics made to
promote other goals.153
C. Constraints
Even an opaque process distributing a scarce good may operate
fairly if the discretion of those within the process is subject to
effective constraints that prevent them from making corrupt
decisions. One possible source of constraints on colleges’

151. KARABEL, supra note 10, at 135.
152. As former Harvard president Drew Gilpin Faust once said, “We could fill our
class twice over with valedictorians.” Pierre Huguet, How to Get Into Top Colleges: Create Your
Student Brand, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2019, 5:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
noodleeducation/2019/02/15/how-to-get-into-top-colleges-create-your-student-brand/
?sh=6d51c71e78b5.
153. Somewhat optimistically, in our view, Madenberg cautions applicants that “[a]s
powerful as it is in college admissions to have a legacy, you need to first fulfill the school’s
requirements before that will help you; legacy will distinguish you from your other
classmates applying to the same school, but it will not make you a stronger student.”
Madenberg & Madenberg, supra note 106, at 95. But see AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH:
LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (Richard D. Kahlenberg, ed.) (2010).
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admissions processes are the agencies that accredit institutions of
higher education.154 Accreditors are supposed to protect consumers
of higher education by, in theory, holding the colleges and
universities to account for their actions.155 Different bodies accredit
universities as a whole and individual programs within them. Even
the routine periodic accreditation visits are major events for most
institutions, requiring months of preparatory work, assembling
thousands of pages of documentation, and hosting a team onsite
with access to records and personnel.156
Accreditation standards for colleges stress values such as
transparency. For example, the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools touts “Core Values” that include “integrity,”
“accountability,” and “transparency.”157 However, these standards
are soft, making few specific demands on admissions departments.
For example, the admissions guidance from the Standards for
Accreditation and Requirements of Affiliation of the Middle States
Commission on Higher Education Standard II—Ethics and
Integrity, says only: “honesty and truthfulness in public relations
announcements, advertisements, recruiting and admissions
materials and practices, as well as in internal communications[.]”158
It is not clear that many universities meet even this weak
standard, as none of the published admission guidelines for the
many universities we reviewed mentioned carve-outs for “special
admissions” categories such as alumni, large donors, or athletics or

154. Whether accreditation is effective is a subject of long-running debate. Davidson,
supra note 148, at 4 (accreditors originally created by elites to as effort to “systematize[] and
enshrine[] their values.”).
155. U.S. Department of Education, Overview of Accreditation in the United States,
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html (“The goal of accreditation
is to ensure that institutions of higher education meet acceptable levels of quality.”).
156. The debate about accreditation and quality is not new. See William Troutt, Regional
Accreditation Evaluative Criteria and Quality Assurance, 50 J. HIGHER EDUC. 199 (1979); Terrel
Rhodes, Show Me the Learning: Value, Accreditation, and the Quality of the Degree, 40 PLANNING
FOR HIGHER EDUC. 36 (2012).
157. Southern Accreditation of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, About
SACSCOC, https://www.sacscoc.org/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
158. This is the sixth point in the MSCHE’s Standard II on Ethics and Integrity.
Standards, MSCHE, https://www.msche.org/standards/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
Handbooks on accreditation and reaccreditation published by SACS say a school must have
an admission policy, but nothing more. See, e.g., Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools Commission on Colleges, Handbook for Institutions Seeking Initial Accreditation 13 (Feb.
2020), https://sacscoc.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Handbook-for-Initial-Accreditation.pdf.
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provided the level of detail routinely required by consumer
protection standards for the similarly expensive purchases such as
real estate.159
Any admissions process is “discriminatory” in that schools are
making choices among applicants. Universities routinely
discriminate against low grades and low standardized test scores.
This is commonly expressed in the process. What is not disclosed
are the biases in favor of the children of alumni and for the progeny
of large donors and powerful parents.160 As Selingo notes, this was
“one reason Harvard fought so hard to keep certain documents
under seal in the discrimination lawsuit filed by Asian-American
applicants.”161 Compared to an overall admissions rate of 6%, 34%
of Harvard legacies who applied were admitted between 2009 and
2015.162 That is, universities discriminate on the basis of grades and
standardized test scores, unless the admissions staff recognized the
relationship to a wealthy family that leads to a decision to admit
under remarkably elastic and opaque standards.
The issue is not simply one of truth in advertising, however.
Admissions departments’ ability to engage in such favoritism is
what created the opportunity for Singer. In our view, higher
education institutions are welcome to favor the children of
potential donors, particular demographic groups, alumni children,
or superb flute players so long as they are clear and transparent
159. The admissions statements provided by most universities are vague and reasons
for rejection are too. Contrast that to applications for mortgages when houses are purchased.
One meets certain income criteria or not. The metrics are quite clear and multiple firms
compete to offer that service. Complaints that minorities are discriminated against in
mortgage offerings by redlining are common and, as a result, the decisions are subject to
strict scrutiny by regulators. See Christopher Brooks, Redlining’s Legacy: Maps Are Gone, but
the Problem Hasn’t Disappeared, CBS NEWS (June 12, 2020, 8:25 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/redlining-what-is-history-mike-bloomberg-comments/.
Rejected applicants are due an explanation focused on specific criteria, unlike rejected
applicants to universities.
160. Biases in favor of donors run back into private high schools. Flanagan describes
how private schools “have two honor codes, two community-standards contracts, and two
disciplinary codes. One is for everyone, and the other is for big donors.” Flanagan, supra note 4.
161. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 159.
162. Id. The legacy issue has become more problematic as schools increased their
selectivity. Daniel Golden, An Analytic Survey of Legacy Preference, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR THE RICH 81 (“When a college rejects only a small proportion of candidates, legacy
preference hardly matters, since most alumni children would get in regardless. As a school
becomes more choosey in admissions, it needs to exercise legacy preference more often if it
wants to satisfy alumni.”).
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about their processes and have in place the compliance systems to
ensure that their admissions offices operate as described and within
the law. This includes the constraints imposed by laws to prevent
discrimination on race, sex, and other protected characteristics,
constraints that are themselves murky because of the confused
jurisprudence in this area.163
In reviewing the admission standards at University of
California Los Angles (UCLA),164 University of California San
Diego (UCSD),165 University of Southern California (USC),166
Chapman
University,167
Georgetown
University,168
and
Northwestern University,169 all involved in operation Varsity Blues,
we could find no reference to “special admittance” based upon
athletics, or based on large donations by famous and powerful
parents.170 Athletics can be staggeringly important at selective
schools: “In the fall of 2018, Amherst enrolled 676 athletes over its
four classes of undergraduates, thirty-six more athletes than the
University of Alabama overall.”171 Nor did we see preferences
163. Rachel Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher
Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 201 (2006) (“The jurisprudence of affirmative action in higher
education has been plagued by ambivalence and ambiguity.”).
164. Application Review Process for Freshmen, UCLA, https://admission.ucla.edu/apply/
freshman/freshman-requirements/application-review-process (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
165. First-Year Student Application Requirements, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO,
https://admissions.ucsd.edu/first-year/application-requirements.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2021).
166. Apply: First-Year Students, UNIV. OF S. CAL., https://admission.usc.edu/apply/
first-year-students/#/additional-application-requirements (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
167. First Year Application Instructions, CHAP. UNIV.: UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSION,
https://www.chapman.edu/admission/undergraduate/how-to-apply/first-year.aspx (last
visited Oct. 4, 2021).
168. First Year Applicant, GEORGETOWN UNIV.: OFF. OF UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS,
https://uadmissions.georgetown.edu/applying/first-year/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
169. The First Step in Your Northwestern Direction is Learning How to Apply, NW. UNIV.,
https://admissions.northwestern.edu/apply/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
170. Selingo provides a careful description of how Emory admitted an applicant with
athletic credentials but lower academic credentials than other students, quoting the
admissions staff member as saying “He can definitely do the work here, . . . I don’t love him,
but the team does.” Selingo concludes that this student “had a hook—he was an athlete the
coach wanted. He got in.” SELINGO, supra note 12, at 92. There is no mention of any
verification of the student’s athletic prowess beyond the coach’s endorsement. Korn and
Levitz report that Singer told parents that the “back door” of making a donation directly to
the university would cost $45–$50 million for entrance to Harvard or Stanford. KORN &
LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 82.
171. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 154. As a result, it becomes harder for non-athletes to
get in. The athletic preference largely benefits a white, well-to-do group of students. SELINGO,
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mentioned for the children of former graduates. However, as an
audit of the University of California System showed, schools
routinely admitted students based on undefined “special talent
admissions” and records of these admissions were conveniently
not kept.172
The missing ingredient in higher education is the application of
sufficient constraints to ensure that admissions offices stick to
implementing the mission with which they are charged by the
institution’s board. Those constraints include both more
transparency than currently exists at most selective institutions and
more board involvement in the operations of the institution. Such
constraints will only come when outside pressures force them to be
adopted, which is why Varsity Blues is a significant missed
opportunity. In Varsity Blues, the accreditation bodies played a role
similar to the rating agencies in the financial crisis—they were in a
position to identify and prevent the problem, but they failed to
do so.
D. Creating a Problem
The combination of a scarce good with an opaque nonmarket
allocation process subject to few constraints creates excellent
conditions for allowing corruption to occur. What is surprising
from Varsity Blues and the evidence uncovered in admissions
litigation and rankings scandals is that college and university

supra note 12, at 156. More generally, former Princeton President William Bowen found that
a student’s probability of entering rose from forty percent to seventy percent if the applicant
was an athlete in a review of nineteen highly selective schools’ admissions records. Id. at 157.
172. Eric Quintanar, UC System Reveals Admissions Records for Student Athletes
Incomplete,
‘Basic
Data’
Unavailable,
DAILY
WIRE
(Feb.
19,
2020),
https://www.dailywire.com/news/uc-system-reveals-admissions-records-for-studentathletes-incomplete-basic-data-unavailable; see also RICHARD D. KHALENBERG, Introduction,
in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH, supra note 153, at 1–2 (noting that legacy status at “elite
colleges” is worth the equivalent to a 160 point higher score the SAT on a 400–1600 scale); id.
at 1 (noting that three-quarters of research universities and “virtually all” liberal arts schools
grant legacy preferences); Peter Schmidt, A History of Legacy Preferences, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION FOR THE RICH, supra note 152, at 57 (“A separate analysis of data from the 1991–92
academic year found that, among the top seventy-five universities in the U.S. News & World
Report rankings, just one, the California Institute of Technology, has no legacy preferences
at all.”); DUFFY & GOLDBERG, supra note 85, at 47 (“Admissions officers have always
carefully considered applications from alumni children. At many of the colleges, prior
to the tidal wave all alumni children who could demonstrate a minimum level of ability
were admitted.”).
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general counsels have not demanded board-level review of
admissions practices. The examples noted from Varsity Blues,
admissions litigation, and rankings scandals partially lift the lid on
the seeming mystery of admissions and gives us a glimpse of the
problems. It is clear from the market in top schools that admission
is valuable and that universities seek to unlock that value for
themselves. Wealthy parents are willing to pay large sums.173 What
distinguishes Varsity Blues is not the corruption, but that Singer
and his accomplices were able to discount admission far below
what universities’ own prices appeared to be by putting their
thumbs on the scale, and often the schools received nothing in
these instances.
How much does it cost to buy your way into a selective
college?174 Indeed, according to some educational consultants,
donating as little $20,000 would be enough to gain an applicant
attention even at a college with an endowment worth hundreds of
millions.175 “At an exclusive college, it can take at least $50,000 with
some assurance that future donations will be even greater.”176 At

173. President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner’s admission provides one data point.
His admission to Harvard happened to be accompanied by a $2.5 million donation to a
library in 1998. Daniel Golden, The Story Behind Jared Kushner’s Curious Acceptance into
Harvard, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-storybehind-jared-kushners-curious-acceptance-into-harvard. Korn and Levitz report emails
from the dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard to an admissions dean for some “big wins”
in admissions that had led to pledges of a building and fellowship funding. KORN & LEVITZ,
supra note 5, at 83.
174. One high price, involving a colorful student, seemed to involve the son and, later,
brother, of the emir of Qatar. He initially was enrolled at a community college twenty-five
miles from his suites in the Beverley Wilshire Hotel. His scholarly work there eventually led
to his application to USC (after being rejected by UCLA). Members of his family and friends
visited with the president of the school, which he then attended. He was often on the Dean’s
list despite rarely being seen on campus. Faculty members were given expensive gifts;
required classes were waived. Appreciating his undergraduate degree, he later entered
a master’s program at USC and was allowed to study “remotely.” How much, if
anything, was donated to USC, is unclear. The story is recounted in Harriet Ryan & Matt
Hamilton, Column One: The True Story of the Heartthrob Price of Qatar and His Time at USC,
L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/true-story-heartthrob-prince-qatar120033827.html?guccounter=1.
175. DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: HOW AMERICA’S RULING CLASS BUYS
ITS WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES—AND WHO GETS LEFT OUTSIDE THE GATES 60 (rev. ed. 2019).
Golden, who attended Harvard, was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his work on college
admissions. See Daniel Golden of the Wall Street Journal, PULITZER PRIZES,
https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/daniel-golden (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
176. GOLDEN, supra note 175, at 60.
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least $100,000 is needed at the top 25, at least $250,000 at the top 10,
and amounts can even exceed a million. 177 Consider this
description of Duke’s admissions process, which makes clear the
routine nature of the consideration of special connections
in admissions:
Twice a year, after evaluating Duke’s first and second round of
applicants, Ms. Scott would lug a box . . . from the admissions
building to President Terry Sanford’s spartan office on the second
floor of the administration building. There, she would unpack its
contents: applications of candidates whom she had intended to
reject but who were on the list of students the president had sent
her for special consideration. He had chosen them not because
they showed academic promise he feared might otherwise go
unnoticed but because they were children of corporate titans
expected, in the event of a favorable decision, to contribute to the
university endowment. Duke, one of the South’s best universities,
aspired to national preeminence—and it needed money to get
there.178

This is part of schools’ unspoken business model. It is natural to
want the children of the rich and famous. These parents can give or
help raise money, raise the school’s visibility, and allow talented
children of non-famous people to hobnob with famous people,
thereby making the school more desirable to attend.
Administrators and faculty will enjoy socializing with these
parents at university gatherings. While universities project an
image of an egalitarian mission based on merit, not money or
influence, the application and acceptance process contradict such
177. Id. at 60. This may be ineffectual. Chad Coffman, Tara O’Neil & Brian Starr, An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Legacy Preferences on Alumni Giving at Top Universities, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH, supra note 153, at 118 (“Our findings cast serious doubt
on the financial justification for legacy preference policies. Using an OLS regression model
with controls for size, public/private, income, wealth, year, and fraction of alumni solicited,
we show that the presence of legacy preference policies does not result in significantly higher
alumni giving. Moreover, we show that prior to controlling for wealth, there is a strong
correlation between alumni giving and legacy preferences. This suggests that greater alumni
giving at elite schools with legacy preferences is driven by the school’s ability to over-select
from their own wealthy alumni populations—not a result of the preference policies
themselves inducing additional giving.”).
178. GOLDEN, supra note 175, at 51; Golden, supra note 162, at 83–84 (“Legacy preference
in college admissions is an almost exclusively American custom. Foreign universities
typically depend on government support, eliminating the financial incentive to admit
alumni children.”).
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claims and accreditors’ alleged standards of integrity
and transparency.
Golden’s explanation of the donations common to help secure
admission indicates an economically rational allocation of scarce
goods by universities. Tuition at many elite schools, such as USC,
is posted at about $60,000 per year.179 While highly desirable
students will be admitted with scholarships, in effect a discount,180
the children of Varsity Blues’ parents were unlikely to be admitted
even if they offered to pay full tuition. That is not unique to them;
as Golden discovered, colleges often expect to receive “donations”
above and beyond tuition. At the selective schools involved in
Varsity Blues, Golden reports the common donation needed to
assist in admission to be $100,000 and up.181 That is, parents of
children who may not make the cut academically pay more than
the posted price.
In economics, this is called first degree price discrimination.182
It occurs when a seller attempts to extract the highest price different
customers are willing to pay for the same service. That is, once
admitted, one is a USC student whether paying $100,000 a year
($60,000 a year tuition plus a donation) and another is paying zero
dollars a year. The seller attempts to identify where on a demand
curve a potential buyer is. In case of college admissions, one way

179. See
Learn:
Cost
and
Financial
Aid,
UNIV.
OF
S.
CAL.,
https://admission.usc.edu/learn/cost-financial-aid/(last visited Oct. 4, 2021). Room and
board are listed separately and reflect the market value of such services as off-campus
alternatives are usually easily available, limiting the prices that can be charged for those
services. Tuition, however, is at the discretion of administrators.
180. Calling a price cut a “scholarship” is brilliant marketing. The school can claim to
be honoring the student when in fact it has calculated the price it must offer to possibly
attract a desirable student given the competition from other schools for such students.
181. GOLDEN, supra note 175, at 60. Golden’s work is the most comprehensive but there
are other reports of donations leading to admissions. See Christopher Rim, Recent Scandal at
Brown Highlights How the Ivy League Grants Special Treatment to Children of Donors, FORBES
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherrim/2019/02/27/recentscandal-at-brown-highlights-how-the-ivy-league-grants-special-treatment-to-childrenof-donors/?sh=2660ba0b1abf.
182. See GOOLSBEE ET AL., supra note 97, at 380–82. Price discrimination is common but
is not evidence of monopoly power. Airlines sell similar seats on the same flights at different
prices in an effort to earn higher revenue, but that does not generate monopoly profits in that
competitive industry. (Selingo analogizes the college admissions process to airline pricing
practices. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 209.) Colleges similarly face many competitors. As
Selingo notes, “Nowadays, college leaders talk about pricing strategies like airline executives
and retailers do.” Id. at 221.
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buyers send signals is by making donations. The result is the seller
captures higher total revenue, extracting much of the consumer
surplus183 from the demanders by selling at the highest price
thought likely to be acceptable to each one. In practice, it allows less
qualified students to help subsidize more desirable students and
allows the university to capture higher total revenue than if they
sold slots to students based only on posted tuition.
However, schools are not attempting to maximize current net
revenue. USC might be able to charge, say, $100,000 a year rather
than the posted price of $60,000 a year, and sell every slot at full
price. But, like other elite schools, it balances revenue against
student body quality and the long-run reputation of the school. If it
sold all student positions to the highest bidders, it could end up
with a less able student body, which would become known not only
by the unhappy faculty but by employers and prospective students.
It would also be less diverse, causing unfavorable publicity and
changing the experience its students would have. In the future,
selling slots to academically able students (and persuading them to
accept offers of admission) would become increasingly difficult.
Administrators setting tuition balance many factors, including
competition from other schools, in working to bring in revenue and
enhance reputation.184
183. Consumer surplus is the difference between the highest price a given demand
would have been willing to pay and the price actually paid. See GOOLSBEE ET AL., supra note
97, at 380–82. Some parents might be willing to pay $100,000 a year for their child to be at,
say, USC, but only have to pay $60,000, thereby allowing the parent to “capture” the $40,000
in value they would have been willing to pay. First degree price discrimination is rarely seen
in practice because it requires the seller to have a lot of information about the demander.
Schools have that—they know the financial status of applicants’ families. They also have
information about how anxious prospective students are to attend. Schools spend significant
resources in the recruitment process, so know potential customers well. They face
competition from other schools. That helps limit the prices they could charge.
184. The price of slots at private universities is not regulated. Higher education is,
however, highly regulated in general. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 253. Schools charge what
they think the market will bear, given their costs, the competition, and other factors. The
Varsity Blues defendants were indicted primarily for mail fraud, honest services fraud, and
money laundering. The various schemes employed reduced average student quality and
allowed other parties, such as coaches, to capture revenue that could have gone to the
schools. What we cannot know is if the students in question might have been admitted if
their parents had given a sizable donation to the school, rather than bribe an employee, but
Golden’s work indicates that is a common practice with, rationally, higher donations being
employed at more selective schools. See also DUFFY & GOLDBERG, supra note 85, at 195
(“Another reason that institutions, particularly prestigious colleges and universities, were
able to raise tuition so sharply in the 1980s was that parents and students began to view the
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The government charged parents who paid bribes, ringers who
took part in the standardized test scam, and university employees
who accepted bribes.185 None of the universities and none of their
executives or boards were charged or received any sanction. None
of the presidents or boards resigned. All escaped the consequences
of their failures of oversight. Prosecuting just the parents, coaches,
and Singer and his associates is like prosecuting bank tellers for
accepting deposits from drug dealers but not demanding the banks
enact money laundering compliance programs. Embarrassment
aside, schools are happy to have such practices limited as they
divert revenue away from the “voluntary donations” that Golden
explained to be a common quid pro quo for admission. By only going
after non-admissions officials at universities, the prosecutors
protected the non-transparent pricing schemes at the schools.186
The prosecutions help thwart one corrupt route to admissions but
not others.187
While many universities suggest their admissions policy is
based upon multiple factors, vague “holistic” approaches provide
room for accommodating students on whose behalf contributions
price of a college as an indication of its quality. This so-called ‘Chivas Regal phenomenon’
emerged as colleges adopted marketing strategies and practices from business in order to
compete for the shrinking number of college-age students.”).
185. See Indictment, supra note 46, for the charges against the defendants.
186. We are not contending these schemes should be illegal, but a lack of transparency
generates more opportunities for corruption that can be viewed as violations of money
laundering rules.
187. While we focus here on the elite private schools involved in Varsity Blues, that
does not mean that is the only place improper payments have been made. Texas Southern
University is not selective but unqualified students paid bribes to get in the law school. See
Shannon Najmabadi, Alleged Bribes, Kickbacks for Law School Admission at Heart of Texas
Southern University Turmoil, TEX. TRIB. (March 11, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/
2020/03/11/admission-bribes-kickbacks-heart-texas-southern-university-turmoil/. Perhaps
even more common is influence peddling. Stories are common of special favors being done
for the children of legislators or friends of members of the board of regents at state
universities. Few come to light as retribution can be significant, as occurred at the University
of Texas at Austin when one board member blew the whistle and was run out of the board.
See Kevin Lokuwaduge, Former UT System Regent Wallace Hall Speaks on Admission Scandal,
DAILY TEXAN (June 18, 2019), https://thedailytexan.com/2019/06/18/former-ut-systemregent-wallace-hall-speaks-on-admission-scandal/. A similar incident was exposed at the
University of Illinois some years ago. See Jodi S. Cohen, Stacy St. Clair & Tara Malone, Clout
Goes to College, CHI. TRIB. (May 29, 2009), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-uoficlout-story.html. As with the Varsity Blues incidents, such favoritism means scarce seats are
given to students who otherwise would not be admitted, thereby denying more deserving,
but less well connected, students.
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are made. Such policies may be effective if properly supervised.
Colleges, their boards, and their executive teams thus failed to
exercise the level of care that the admissions policies they approved
demanded.188 Living up to the level of care to which the legal
system holds corporate boards and financial institutions does not
seem an unreasonable demand to put on boards supervising
institutions whose decisions affect thousands of lives and whose
massive endowments help insulate them from market discipline.
Indeed, as all boards of organizations of the size of these
universities, charitable or commercial, are held to the same
standard of care as public companies, it is not just reasonable, it is
required.189 Corporate boards must not only assure the existence of
information and reporting systems but also take action when these
systems raise red flags.190
III. CONTROLLING CORRUPTION IN NONMARKET ALLOCATIONS OF
SCARCE GOODS
Corruption in admissions involves money laundering.191 Since
law enforcement began to focus on (and to define) money
laundering in the 1970s in the course of the war on drugs, a vast
compliance industry has arisen to address concerns over money
laundering in everything from banking to real estate to car sales.192
Anti-money laundering obligations are internationally recognized.

188. See McGreal, supra note 19, at 678 (noting that in Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695
(Del. 2009), the Delaware Supreme Court held corporate officers to the same fiduciary duties
as directors).
189. For a discussion on point, see Nancy B. Rapoport, Managing U.S. News & World
Report—The Enron Way, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 423 (2012). The author argues that falsification of
data for rankings purposes, which does not appear to be uncommon, should result in liability
for senior administrators at board members at universities.
190. John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37
YALE J. REG. 1, 7 (2020).
191. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 276 (quoting Singer at his sentencing telling the
judge, “I am absolutely guilty of that [money laundering] as well, ma’am.”).
192. Grand View Research, ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING MARKET SIZE, SHARE & TRENDS
ANALYSIS REPORT BY COMPONENT (SOFTWARE, SERVICES), BY PRODUCT TYPE, BY DEPLOYMENT,
BY END USE (BFSI, GOVERNMENT, HEALTHCARE, IT & TELECOM), AND SEGMENT FORECASTS,
2019–2025 (2019).
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According to the Vienna Convention and the Palermo
Convention, money laundering can include three distinct types
of behavior:
(i) the conversion or transfer, knowing that such property is the
proceeds of crime[;] (ii) the concealment or disguise of the true
nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of
or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is
the proceeds of crime; and (iii) the acquisition, possession or use
of property, knowing, at the time of the receipt, that such property
is the proceeds of crime.193

Ensuring compliance with money laundering rules is aimed at the
top of organizations. The administrators and trustees of
universities cannot absolve themselves from responsibility. For
example, federal guidelines for Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance
state that
[t]he board of directors is responsible for ensuring that the BSA
compliance officer has appropriate authority, independence, and
access to resources to administer an adequate BSA/AML
compliance program based on the bank’s ML/TF and other illicit
financial activity risk profile. The BSA compliance officer should
regularly report the status of ongoing compliance with the BSA to
the board of directors and senior management so that they can

193. Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism—Topics, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2021). The definition of property includes intangible assets, such as
admissions to a university. See also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM Annex VI-9 (2006) (“The
term funds or other assets means financial assets, property of every kind, whether tangible or
intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments
in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such funds or
other assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, traveler’s cheques, bank cheques,
money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, or letters of credit, and any interest,
dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds or other
assets.” (third emphasis added)); OFF. FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, RISK FACTORS OF OFAC
COMPLIANCE IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 2 (2005) (“Property is anything of value and
property interests may be direct, indirect, present, future, or contingent. When proving that
property is the proceeds of crime, it should to be necessary that a person be convicted of a
predicate offense.”); see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION
33 (2021).
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make informed decisions about existing risk exposure and the
overall BSA/AML compliance program.194

These rules also apply to non-profit organizations, including
universities. For example, in 2009 several rabbis were among
forty-four people arrested for laundering money generated from
narcotics trafficking and bribery. The rabbis laundered the money
through non-profit religious institutions they controlled.195 The
scheme was similar to Operation Varsity Blues as the money was
moved as a donation to a charity. Schools are a known recipient of
laundered funds so are required to abide by the AML laws.196
In particular, students coming from high-risk nations are being
recruited, admitted, and paying school fees.197 The fees are being
paid by parents who need not explain their sources of wealth, a key
component of modern anti-money laundering efforts (as anyone
who has applied for a mortgage in the United States knows well).198
Charities and non-profits can be used as a mechanism for
bribery. Charitable donations, community investment projects, and
sponsorships can all be employed. The donations are made to buy
the decision-making power over contracts or regulations that affect
the company. They can also “be used to channel funds to front
organisations controlled by a bribery recipient.”199 The core of
Varsity Blues is the bribery of university officials and employees by
parents for admission to the university’s educational programs for
their children. Instead of just handing officials cash, the parents
194. FED.
FIN.
INSTS.
EXAMINATIONS
COUNCIL,
BSA/AML
MANUAL,
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/AssessingTheBSAAMLComplianceProgram/04.
195. Linda McGlasson, Money Laundering at the Heart of NY/NJ Arrests, BANK INFO SEC.
(July 24, 2009), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/money-laundering-at-heart-nynjarrests-a-1652.
196. David Prosser, Money Laundering Goes Back to School, ARACHNYS (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.arachnys.com/money-laundering-goes-back-to-school/.
197. Yojana Sharma, International HE Fuels Corruption in Student Admissions,
UNIV. WORLD NEWS (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.universityworldnews.com/
post.php?story=20131004142900721.
198. See, e.g., Charles Russell Speechlys, Unexplained Wealth Orders: Playing the
Trump Card, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g
=60d90f5e-9b4a-4da4-aee9-f7ebc86ab7e7; Bret Hood, Money Laundering and Mortgages:
How to Keep Yourself Safe, NAT’L MORTGAGE PRO. (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/73941/money-laundering-mortgageskeep-yourself-safe.
199. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, Sponsorship, Donations & Community Investment, in
ANTI-BRIBERY GUIDANCE (Peter van Veen ed., 2018).
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used intermediaries. The first was the “fixer,” Singer, who arranged
the bribes. The second was using a charity such as KWF or an
athletic or other university-connected foundation through which
the bribe was laundered. In essence, the universities sold admission
for laundered cash, which was laundered through organizations
the schools controlled.
Money laundering charges often carry heavy sentences—and,
in part, it was the threat of the addition of such charges that likely
motivated many of the Varsity Blues defendants to plead guilty.200
Similarly, admissions based on allowing a wealthy applicant’s
family to bypass the published admissions requirements and
secure admission for their child by making a donation are (at least
arguably) illegal. To see why, change the parties involved: A
company makes inferior concrete not up to standards required by
a city’s bid requirements. However, if the owner donates $100,000
to the mayor’s reelection campaign, the company gets the contract
to supply the city concrete. Admission as quid pro quo for a donation
is no different.
When is a charitable donation a bribe? According to the Global
Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre: “Charitable donations are
the giving or providing, directly or indirectly, of cash, venues,
equipment, personnel time or other benefit to a charity, or to an
individual or organisation who is nominated by or connected with
a charity.”201 That is, a donation could be considered to be a bribe if
it is given or received with the intention of influencing someone to
act improperly, or as a reward for having acted improperly.202
Making a donation to get admission appears to be an implicit part
of selective schools’ admission policies.203 Indeed, these admissions
200. In the case of public universities, bribery charges under the USA PATRIOT ACT
are also a possibility. See Compliance with Laws when Conducting University Activities
Overseas: Anti-Bribery, Economic Sanctions, Foreign Boycotts, Anti-Terrorism and Foreign Laws,
GEO.
WASH.
U.,
https://compliance.gwu.edu/compliance-laws-when-conductinguniversity-activities-overseas (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
201. Political and Charitable Donations, GIACC, https://giaccentre.org/gifts-politicaldonations/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
202. Id.
203. Peter Sacks, The Political Economy of Legacy Admissions, Taxpayer Subsidies, and
Excess “Profits” in American Higher Education: Strategies for Reform, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR THE RICH, supra note 153, at 215 (“If we are to believe Harvard’s claim—that it needs to
provide legacy preferences in order to create good will and to entice donations—then alumni
donors are essentially investing in shares of the Harvard enterprise on the expectation of
some future economic benefit.”).
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schemes are similar to the facts that led to pharmaceutical giant
Novartis settling claims arising from the use of illegal charities to
funnel payments in a kickback scheme. Novartis agreed to pay
$51.24 million to settle the claims that the firm used illegal charities
to pay co-payments of Medicare patients taking Novartis’ drugs
Gilenya and Afinitor, as part of an overall $642 million settlement.
Novartis used charities to funnel money as a “kickback” to increase
usage of its drugs by paying patients’ co-payment obligations.
The Novartis scheme worked like this: Patients enrolled in a
free drug program, which provided them with Gilenya and
Afinitor donated by Novartis, thus costing Novartis potential sales.
These patients were then shifted to Medicare, which would then
pay Novartis for the drugs. However, because Medicare required a
co-pay for the prescriptions, patients would object to the change.
To solve this problem, Novartis arranged for a charity to cover the
co-pays and then provided the charity with the funds to do so via
a tax-deductible contribution. Novartis made sure that the
intermediary and “charity” coordinated the applications for
payments so the “charity” was sure to select their potential
Novartis patients.204 From the patients’ point of view, there was no
change: they continued to receive the drugs for free. From Novartis’
point of view, the company went from donating the drugs to
receiving payment for them.
At an elite university, when a coach is given authority to
designate a certain number of candidates for admission as athletes
who will receive special consideration, the coach is being given

204. Novartis Pays Over $642 Million to Settle Allegations of Improper Payments to Patients
and Physicians, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 1, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/novartispays-over-642-million-settle-allegations-improper-payments-patients-and-physicians.
Novartis was the only contributor to the charity for co-pay assistance. Novartis told the
charity that it would donate money to the fund/charity only if the eligibility definition was
crafted to make sure that patients using Novartis’ drugs would receive most of the co-pay
assistance. The charity agreed and Novartis patients received a greater proportion of
assistance. Novartis Resolves Legacy Litigation Matters, Finalizing Settlement of Speaker
Program Litigation with Government in the US and Positioning Company for the Future by
Scaling Its Next-Generation Digital Enhancement Technologies, NOVARTIS (Jul. 2, 2020),
https://www.novartis.com/news/media-releases/novartis-resolves-legacy-litigationmatters-finalizing-settlement-speaker-program-litigation-government-us-and-positioningcompany-future-fully-scaling-its-next.
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something valuable to distribute.205 In theory, these designations
are to be used for the benefit of a program, such as water polo, and
the university as a whole. The temptation, as Varsity Blues
demonstrates, is that the designations can be used for substantial
private gain.206 That is a private profit from the sale of a designation
at the expense of the university, which, of course, is why the
coaches were charged with crimes.
University employees are agents who must adhere to the law
relevant to their duties, and universities must take steps to have in
place systems to ensure that their employees do so. This is true with
respect to Title IX, FERPA, and the Cleary Act. It follows that a
university has a duty to supervise and to conduct a reasonable due
diligence investigation of the facts. If the applicant has been
awarded a scholarship for fencing, the application will come with
material on the student’s fencing prowess. In Varsity Blues, the
applicants submitted fabricated accomplishments.
Fixing such problems is not rocket science nor does it require
intrusive government intervention into admissions processes.207
What is needed is for robust, internal compliance programs, which
should be run outside the department in which a coach is
employed, to check the veracity of the information presented. This
can involve simply calling the high school from which the applicant
will graduate, getting copies of matters related to fencing at the
school, and speaking to the fencing coach. While it is not
intellectually difficult to create such systems, compliance requires
thought and effort.208 Such a program should be no more
burdensome than the current practice of many selective schools of
having multiple readers for each file to guard against biases and
errors.209 A comprehensive compliance program within
205. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 121 (noting that coaches of non-revenue sports
“had that one particularly useful perk: minimal oversight of recruiting and major influence
with the admissions office”).
206. Id. at 122 (noting that the Georgetown tennis coach received $2.7 million from
Singer between 2012–18).
207. DUFFY & GOLDBERG, supra note 85, at 196 (“The Chivas Regal phenomenon
continued to operate throughout the 1980s. A 1988 Gallup poll of 1,000 students between the
ages of 13 and 21 found that 38 percent of them agreed that ‘the higher the tuition costs of a
college, the better the quality of education a student will receive.’”).
208. L. Burke Files, Due Diligence for the Financial Professional, AEGIS J. 69–110 (2010).
209. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 101. Selingo compares his experience sitting in with three
admissions departments to the Varsity Blues story and concludes that even where readers
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universities will reduce the kind of corruption uncovered in Varsity
Blues. Such programs need not disrupt colleges’ efforts to “shape”
their classes according to legitimate factors (e.g. excluding bribes).
These programs will cost money, but the burden they impose on
the $10 billion admissions business will be no more
disproportionate to the size of the market than what we already ask
of car dealers, jewelry stores, and banks.210
However, this does not address the use of above-board
donations to universities that influence admissions. As one of the
authors has previously explained: “So what is a corrupt
transaction? A corrupt transaction is when a person chooses to use
their powers delegated to them to enter into an unauthorized
agreement to the detriment of the one(s) who delegated the power
of choice.”211 Making donations to universities to obtain admission
is not substantively different than GlaxoSmithKlein bribing doctors
and hospitals to recommend their drugs over others.
GlaxoSmithKlein’s conviction for bribery led to a $490 million
fine212 because legitimate funds were used for illegitimate
purposes. The drug company, like the parents, used legitimate
flagged a file for “absent pieces of information or other inconsistencies, the issues were
usually minor. . . . Even in those cases, the readers usually didn’t have time to search the
Internet for additional information, so they moved on, assuming, perhaps, that these were
oversights and nothing more.” Id. at 146. He found that applicants who provided unverified
details of activities could enhance their chances with “an overburdened admissions reader.”
Id. at 155. Although Selingo concludes that “admissions counselors are not hired to be
detectives” and the “high volume of applications and small number of staff leave the process
vulnerable to embellishment or outright lying,” id. at 146–47, we believe both the high
volume and the small staff are the result of deliberate choices by selective universities. Other
businesses are denied the option of having a “small staff” that cannot keep up with the
demands of compliance problems and we see no reason to exempt universities from that
obligation. See also KINKEAD, supra note 120, at 57 (“For years, Johnston said, Yale has had a
rule that no athletic coach can institute recruiting, but if a young athlete has written to a
coach, or has formally applied for admission, the coach is free to correspond with him—to
send him monthly department letters and game programs, keep him aware of the
admissions-committee deadlines he must meet, and urge on him the virtues of Yale.”).
210. One of us has previously argued that cost-benefit analysis deserves an important
role in evaluating anti-money laundering legislation. See Richard Gordon & Andrew P.
Morriss, Moving Money: International Financial Flows, Taxes, and Money Laundering,
37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 101 (2013).
211. L. Burke Files, Commencement Address, University of Ibadan Nigeria, Joint Venture
in Anti-Corruption Training with the American Anti-Corruption Institute (Feb. 26, 2020) (on
file with authors).
212. GlaxoSmithKline Fined $490m by China for Bribery, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-29274822.
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income for improper purposes, which constitutes a bribe and
money laundering.
One path to admission is buying it. An applicant may have a
weak record or substandard test scores. Such applicants are
unsuited for admission, except for one special attribute: they come
from a wealthy family. A family member or related party, by
donating money to the university, buys the applicant’s admission.
A donation allows the substandard application to jump the queue
of qualified students and exclude from admission an otherwise
qualified applicant.
No school has a stated “admission by donation” or “friends of
a regent or legislator” category. If they did, it at least would be an
above-board transparent transaction, albeit one that would reduce
the prestige of the university. Instead, the transactions are cloaked
in deception. They use a third party. With a wink and a nod, the
money is sent to a university foundation, as the conduit for the
bribe, and the exchange is understood. Without the payment, there
would be no admission for the otherwise substandard applicant.
As one of the authors has noted previously, “[c]orruption is also a
fix. Corruption is an effective risk and profit management tool.
A bit of wealth spread out amongst the decision-makers, and the
decisions go your way. The decision-makers could be politicians,
judges, law enforcement, those who award contracts, buyers,
sellers, shippers, regulators, or college admission staff.”213
As we have discussed, elite universities have highly sought
after (scarce) admissions offers. These qualities create value in
admissions that gives rise to opportunities for corruption.214 Items
of value, tangible or intangible, over $10,000 are subject to a variety
of anti-money laundering regulations. The Bank Secrecy Act,215 the

213. Files, supra note 211. For another example, see the suit against Baptiste and Boncy
for making tax-deductible donations to a charity as a conduit for funds to be paid to Haitian
officials to get contracts for a project at a port. Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Baptiste, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91120 (D. Mass. May 31, 2019) (No. 17-cr-10305-ADB),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1109781/download.
214. One of the few papers on this point is Myra E. J. B. Williamson, Contract Cheating
and Academic Integrity in Higher Education: What Can Universities, Quality Assurance Agencies
and Governments Do to Understand, Prevent and Respond to the Challenge?, 7TH INT’L ANN. CONF.
LEGAL REG. FOR INV. DEV. (Oct. 2020), https://kilaw.edu.kw/annualConference/contractcheating-and-academic-integrity-in-higher-education-what-can-universities-quality-assuranceagencies-and-governments-do-to-understand-prevent-and-respond-to-the-challenge/.
215. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332.

55

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

USA PATRIOT ACT,216 and the Money Laundering Control Act217
all apply to money laundering tied to the crime of bribery. All
parents in Varsity Blues who purchased admissions to universities
paid over $10,000. Thus, all universities created an intangible asset
in excess of $10,000. As a result, the universities were (and are)
required to have specific and written guidelines on how to deal
with these valuable assets. The guidelines (AML Manual) must be
approved by senior management and/or the board.218 Further, they
are required to have policies and procedures to prevent bribery and
corruption.219 They did not. Additionally, these universities are
highly dependent on federal funding.220
Why should AML rules apply to university admission
procedures as they do to financial institutions and the sellers of
valuable goods?221 Because:

216. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C.,
31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
217. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957.
218. Stephanie Brooker & Linda Noonan, The Complete Compliance and Ethics Manual
2021,
COSMOS,
https://compliancecosmos.org/anti-money-laundering-complianceprograms-financial-institutions-and-other-businesses (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
219. See WOLFSBERG GROUP, WOLFSBERG ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION (ABC)
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME GUIDANCE 2 (2017), https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/
sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsberg-standards/3.%20Wolfsberg-Group-ABC-GuidanceJune-2017.pdf.
220. Sacks, supra note 203, at 213 (“Harvard, by contrast [to the University of Phoenix],
is so dependent upon federal largesse that Harvard would not be Harvard were its financial
ties to the federal government to be severed. First, Harvard receives hundreds of millions of
dollars per year from the government to do research in medicine, science, and other fields.
Harvard’s second tether to the federal government is related to the university’s ‘nonprofit’
status. As a nonprofit educational institution, Harvard receives tax-free gifts from private
donors who use the ‘charitable deduction’ rules of the federal tax code to reduce the amount
of incomes taxes they owe the government.”).
221. Selingo comments:
The use of numerical ratings in holistic admissions makes it seem that
admissions officers are like actuaries at a bank assessing someone’s credit score,
income, and debt obligations to approve a loan. But unlike bank underwriters,
who work with specific guidelines, admissions officers are more akin to Wall
Street brokers predicting future performance of a stock based on past results.
SELINGO, supra note 12, at 100. We don’t want to push the financial analogy too far, but that
an important analyst of the industry reaches for financial industry analogies seems to
strengthen our argument.
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1. Admissions is a “big business,” with colleges spending
“an estimated $10 billion annually on recruiting
students.”222
2. Applicants gained admission by bribing university
employees.
3. Applicants gained admission by bribing universities
with charitable donations.
4. A university with applicants likely to offer to engage in
such bribes, in effect to pay more than stated tuition
valued at over $10,000, should be required to have an
AML compliance and reporting program.
5. Payments to an employee or gifts to the university that
are linked to admissions can be considered bribes. For
public universities, offering, requesting, paying, or
accepting a bribe can be a federal crime.223
6. Moving money in concert with a crime is a form of
money laundering.224
7. The universities failed to supervise employees who
accepted bribes. As Varsity Blues showed, universities
fail to have even minimal levels of due diligence or
compliance programs to address bribery or money
laundering, as is commonly required of virtually all
organizations handling large amounts of cash.
Varsity Blues also exposed the hypocrisy of colleges and
universities in their admissions processes and their failure to live
up to the standards they require of their applicants. Most
applications for college admission include an attestation to the
truthfulness and accuracy of the submission like this one from the
Common Application:

222. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 21. Selingo quotes Richard Whiteside, former
admissions dean at Tulane as saying, “Colleges are a business . . . and admissions is its chief
source of revenue.” Id. at 40.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 201; see LEGAL INFO. INST., Bribery, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/bribery (last visited Oct. 4, 2021) (“Proof of bribery requires demonstrating a ‘quid pro
quo’ relationship in which the recipient directly alters behavior in exchange for the gift.”).
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
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I certify that all information submitted in the admission process—
including this application and any other supporting materials—is
my own work, factually true, and honestly presented, and that
these documents will become the property of the institution to
which I am applying and will not be returned to me. I understand
that I may be subject to a range of possible disciplinary actions,
including admission revocation, expulsion, or revocation of
course credit, grades, and degree should the information I have
certified be false.225

When admissions can be conducted through a quid pro quo option,
the fidelity only goes one way—from applicant to the university.
Herein lies the grave weakness of the opaque admissions process—
and part of why it is intentionally opaque at selective schools.
Payments, such as donations to the school from wealthy parents
and special treatment for the children of famous people, allow
schools to structure the student body to increase demand for the
school (so one can go to school with the children of high-profile
parents) and increase gross revenue from multiple sources by tying
admission to donations outside of tuition payments.
While Varsity Blues is a satisfying populist spectacle of
celebrities brought low, as high-profile people discovered the rules
apply to them too, the criminal charges brought exclusively against
only the parents, intermediaries, and coaches makes clear that the
legal requirements of honest behavior in the market for admission
to selective schools, as implemented, apply only to parents and
low-level employees. Left untouched are those with the power to
solve the problem, the people who designed the admission
processes and who have oversight over them, those who are at the
executive and board levels of top universities. Sadly, it also seems
to have reinforced the idea that brand-name schools matter because
“[t]here were people willing to risk going to jail to get their kids
into a top school.”226
In Varsity Blues, federal law enforcement officials devoted
considerable resources to catching parents and fraud merchants

225. COMMON APPLICATION, FIRST-YEAR APPLICATION 5, https://commonapp.my.
salesforce.com/sfc/p/#d0000000eEna/a/0V000001AvzW/QhEpCB7Yq_XEzgZAjJKvEF44
6j7K6_V82DikZi6SReU (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
226. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 162.
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such as Singer in what was portrayed as a unique scam.227 Some of
these individuals were charged with money laundering. However,
the schools, multimillion-dollar tax-exempt organizations selling
valuable services,228 were not held accountable for their failure to
provide the level of integrity demanded of financial institutions
and the sellers of goods such as cars, yachts, and jewelry. Much as
money-laundering rules arose as a separate focus of law
enforcement because of the lack of success in controlling
underlying criminal acts in the illegal drug market, the application
of criminal laws to the parents, coaches, and third parties but not
the universities or their boards and leadership results in a failure to
address the source of the flaws in college admissions. This is a
problem wherever the combination of scarcity, opacity, and lack of
constraints applies to a nonmarket process. Fixing the Varsity Blues
problem will not solve all the problems with elite college
admissions practices, but it will fix some important ones.229
The universities suffered only minor, temporary public
embarrassment from Varsity Blues. They were mostly portrayed as
victims.230 Yet these institutions should have been held liable for
not taking steps to prevent the bad behavior. This is not a case of
amateur oversight by bumbling professors running universities in
between teaching and research; that era of university governance is
long gone. As Korn and Levitz noted, Singer’s scheme worked
because of “inertia, idiocy, and an innate trust by admissions
officials and guidance counselors that nobody would ever even
cook up a scheme as brazen as his.”231 The lack of even minimal due
diligence can only have been intentional because universities value
227. Id. at 148 (“In many ways, Varsity Blues was an egregious case of something that
has been going on in private high schools and suburban public schools in a more widespread,
and legal, way for years.”).
228. Id. at 12 (“What I hope to do in this book is show you that college admissions is a
business—a big one—that you have very little control over.”).
229. Consider just one staggering statistic from Selingo’s analysis:
In 2019, 67 percent of freshmen at Harvard reported that they took AP Calculus in
high school, and another 30 percent took some kind of calculus class. That’s all
first-year students at Harvard, no matter their major. But consider this: only half
of American high schools offer a calculus course.
Id. at 168.
230. Korn and Levitz note that prosecutors cast the universities and testing agencies as
victims in part because they needed victims harmed by the individual defendants’ behavior
to justify jail terms for the individual defendants. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 296, 302–03.
231. Id. at 201.
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admissions processes that allow coaches discretion and rely on
subjective “personality” scores, and other easy-to-manipulate
criteria because it allows them to avoid hard questions from
applicants and society as a whole about how they distribute the
benefits of elite education.232 Similarly, testing organizations’
security procedures were easily circumvented by bribing a single
individual. This again reflects a failure of governance: when an
organization whose primary mission is administering tests flubs
security measures this basic, it seems axiomatic that the board has
failed to exercise effective oversight.233
When business organizations’ boards fail to exercise proper
governance, they risk liability for their failure to live up to the
board’s duty of loyalty. As noted previously, in the landmark
Caremark decision the Delaware Chancery Court interpreted the
duty of care to require proper oversight.234 An analogous duty
imposed on boards of universities would put the focus where it
belongs—the parties who can most effectively address the problem.
Moreover, it would empower the university employees charged
with preventing corruption in admissions to bring issues to the
attention of the board. As Jon Smollen noted, from his “prior
vantage point as a practitioner, the landmark status of Caremark is
unassailable and provided a standing invitation [to Smollen] as a
Chief Compliance Officer to enter board rooms as opposed to being
summoned only when problems arose.”235
The application of anti-money laundering laws to admissions
corruption—as revealed in Varsity Blues—provides the hook to
require such action without additional legislation. That is,
universities offer an intangible asset of “special admission”
through discretionary admissions policies including athletics
admissions, alumni preferences, personality scores, and so on.
Admission to selective schools is valuable; the data points from

232. There is an increasing debate over the benefits of elite educations. See SELINGO,
supra note 12, at 245–47 (suggesting that data supports value of skill acquisition over
elite institutions).
233. The parent of a classmate of a Singer client tried to report the decidedly irregular
process of a Singer client taking the ACT in his own home with his mother as a proctor (a
ruse to conceal from the child that a professional test taker was actually taking his test) and
was unable to “make it past the first-line receptionist.” KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 257.
234. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
235. Jon Smollen, Introduction, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597 (2018).
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Operation Varsity Blues alone set the “market prices” for admission
at elite schools between $15,000 and $600,000 (above tuition), in line
with the prior discussion on securing admission with donations.
These sums put the value of admission to an elite school in excess
of the $10,000 threshold for non-financial institutions to be required
to implement and administer an anti-money laundering program
and the corresponding compliance regimen under current federal
law.236 Indeed, in general, “Designated Non-Financial Business
Professions” are considered attractive channels for money
laundering, financial crime, and terrorist financing operations.237
The required compliance regimen also includes reporting
obligations for suspicious transactions to FinCEN on a Suspicious
Transaction Report.238 In Varsity Blues, bribery tied to a transaction
is a crime by the seller of the service and should have been treated
as such.239
A quick way for the government to spur action would be for the
Department of Justice or state attorneys general to investigate
university admissions for the schools where Varsity Blues
uncovered problems, focusing on the failure to have an adequate
(or, indeed, any) AML program. The Department of Education
could require accrediting bodies to report on the effectiveness of
the schools they oversee at implementing AML procedures, which
would spur a nationwide scramble to develop such procedures.240
236. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (June 2021), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf. In addition, all charitable
organizations that solicit money from the public are required to file IRS Form 990 with the
Attorney General’s Office of the state in which they are domiciled each and every year. IRS,
Providing Copies of Form 990-PF (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/private-foundations/providing-copies-of-form-990-pf-to-state-officers.
237. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT, FATF GUIDANCE (Feb. 2013), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf.
238. OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS (SAR),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bank-operations/
financial-crime/suspicious-activity-reports/index-suspicious-activity-reports.html.
239. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FINCEN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORT (F IN CEN SAR) ELECTRONIC F ILING INSTRUCTIONS
(Oct.
2012),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN%20SAR%20ElectronicFiling
Instructions-%20Stand%20Alone%20doc.pdf.
240. Selingo concluded that colleges and universities already “operate like a cartel.”
SELINGO, supra note 12, at 253. If he is correct, this increases the need for outside intervention.
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AML compliance requires comprehensive due diligence on each
customer as well as control of the highly valued items. It will
produce clear and transparent controls on the administrative
allocation of admissions. Such an approach would help avoid the
next Varsity Blues by forcing shareholders to think the problem
through. Moreover, it is clear from their subsequent behavior that
universities have not gotten the message that their admissions
processes are broken. Korn and Levitz quote “insiders” speaking at
a post-Varsity Blues admissions conference as saying “again and
again” that “[t]his was not an admissions scandal.”241
As Claire Hill notes in her discussion of Caremark’s penumbra,
a reason to draw lines short of the minimum required by the law is
that “steering clear of actual lawbreaking should be harder if one
allows” practices that violate the spirit of the law while honoring
the letter. “People apt to go up to the line sometimes go over it,
especially insofar as the harms that motive the law are largely
present in near-the-line cases.”242
As Varsity Blues demonstrates, the universities involved utterly
failed in this regard.243 Coaches were able to sell the “special
In an earlier antitrust suit, the Department of Justice charged the eight Ivy League schools
and M.I.T. of colluding to fix prices. The schools settled the case without admitting liability
but did stop sharing financial aid decisions with one another. Lyle Denniston, U.S., Ivy League
Agree to Settle Antitrust Suit; MIT, Also Charged, to Stand Its Ground, BALT. SUN (May 23, 1991),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1991-05-23-1991143102-story.html; Robert
L. Jackson, MIT Agrees to Settle Antitrust Suit, U.S. Says, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 1993, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-12-23-mn-4834-story.html.
241. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 321. Some schools did adopt minor reforms to
check on athletic admissions. See id. at 322. California also enacted legislation to require
schools to disclose admissions preferences for donors. Id. at 323.
242. Hill, supra note 22, at 689.
243. As Paul E. McGreal, one of the experts on Caremark duties, notes, the duty involves
two components: an initial duty to establish an ethics program and an ongoing duty to
monitor the operation of that program. The standard for the initial duty is stated by the
courts in “remarkably deferential terms,” suggesting that violation requires “a complete
absence of action.” McGreal, supra note 19, at 676–77; Universities might argue their
violations of AML laws were inadvertent as a result of lax oversight. See Mark Reilly, Feds
Fine Former U.S. Bank Risk Officer, Cite Poor Oversight of Anti-Money Laundering Rules,
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/
news/2020/03/06/feds-fine-former-u-s-bank-risk-officer-cite-poor.html. However, as many
financial institutions have discovered, ignorance of AML rules is not a defense. Nor is it a
defense for those paying the bribes. See Anthony Diosdi, Does Lori Loughlin Have an “Ignorance
of the Law” as a Defense to a Charge of Money Laundering?, SF TAX COUNSEL (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://sftaxcounsel.com/does-lori-loughlin-have-an-ignorance-of-the-law-a-defense-to-acharge-of-money-laundering-by-anthony-diosdi/.
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admission” athletic designations with little or no oversight.244
Further, after the sale of admission, universities did not have a
process to review the bona fides of the applicants—even at the most
basic level of asking whether the applicants really played the sport
in which they claimed high-level accomplishments. Universities
are responsible for the actions of their agents, such as coaches, in
these matters. Several of the purchased “special admission”
designations were awarded to students with falsified credentials
using programs most accessible to the wealthy and privileged:
tennis, volleyball, crew, water polo, and lacrosse.245
Nonprofit entities have no shareholders to bring such claims.
However, state attorneys general have oversight responsibilities for
nonprofits and state universities and could provide an alternative
institutional actor capable of forcing the development of an
effective compliance regime.246 News reports on the shareholder
suit against Boeing’s board for Caremark duty violations in
connection with the 737 MAX jet’s failures describe the plaintiffs as
having had access to “more than 44,000 internal company
documents.”247 Even the thought of sharing documents on
admissions on that scale with their states’ attorneys general should
be highly motivating to university boards to establish procedures
with reasonable safeguards. One relatively straightforward means
of addressing such problems would be to provide safe harbors and
244. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 95 (describing athletic admissions as “[T]he
coaching staff determines its top picks and puts the names forward to the admissions
office.”). Since admissions offices spend only a few minutes on most applications, “even if
they understand the difference between a setter and a middle hitter [in volleyball], they don’t
have the time to check out how good a potential athletic recruit really is.” Id. at 96. At USC,
Singer developed a “highly organized and systematic at every step” process, working with
a corrupt athletics official, who even provided edits of the profiles Singer crafted for his
clients. Id. at 114.
245. Some of these programs may even exist to solicit contributions; these sports, unlike
football and basketball, are not revenue generators. On non-revenue vs. revenue sports, see
Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew J. Notowidigdo & Nicole F. Ozminkowski, Who
Profits From Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in Modern College Sports 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working
Paper 27734, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27734; Emma Healy, The Hidden Revenue
Behind Non-Revenue Sports, HEIGHTS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.bcheights.com/2021/
02/08/importance-of-non-revenue-sports/.
246. Each state handles such matters slightly differently; the relevant offices are listed
by the National Association of State Charity Officials. See NAT’L ASS’N STATE CHARITY OFFS.,
STATE GOVERNMENT, https://www.nasconet.org/resources/state-government/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2021).
247. Tangel & Pasztor, supra note 96, at 2.

63

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:1 (2021)

public oversight through the relevant state attorney general until
each institution establishes an independent, ombudsperson
position with authority to investigate, publicize, and challenge
board decisions and lack of action.
CONCLUSION
USC’s Code of Ethics asserts:
We recognize that the fundamental relationships upon which
our university is based are those between individual students and
individual professors; thus, such relationships are especially
sacred and deserve special care that they not be prostituted or
exploited for base motives or personal gain.
When we make promises as an institution, or as individuals
who are authorized to speak on behalf of USC, we keep those
promises, including especially the promises expressed and
implied in our Role and Mission Statement. We try to do what is
right even if no one is watching us or compelling us to do the right
thing.248

While such pious language is common, there is no more reason
to think multibillion-dollar, tax-exempt institutions, such as USC,
will act any more ethically or, more importantly, legally than
for-profit institutions such as banks. And, while universities fail to
clean up their admissions processes, “little incentive will exist for
high school seniors—or whoever’s filling out their applications—to
think twice before signing an affirmation on the Common
Application that submitted material ‘is my own work, factually
true, and honestly presented.’”249 We want to believe college
admissions is a meritocracy, but even if we recognize that, as Jeffrey
Selingo concludes, “it never was that, and likely never will be,”250
we can at least insist that the process be resilient to bribery
and money laundering. Moreover, we can protect the innocent
victims of universities’ failures to take the steps necessary to have
admissions processes with integrity—such as those whose athletic

248. Code of Ethics, UNIV. OF S. CAL.: POLICIES AND POL’Y GOVERNANCE (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://policy.usc.edu/ethics/.
249. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 324.
250. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 8. As Selingo notes later, everyone struggles to define
“merit.” Id. at 93.
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profiles were misappropriated by Singer to make his clients
look better.251
The lack of transparency in university admission standards
makes selective colleges ripe for corruption, as exposed in Varsity
Blues. Even the head of the College Board calls for stopping “the
madness that has arisen around college admissions.”252 We showed
that the Department of Justice addressed only part of the problem.
Investigators uncovered bad actors but let university
administrations off the hook. The laws that govern financial
institutions, including AML rules and processes, apply to
universities selling valuable services. College administrators and
boards know influence is used to secure highly valued admissions.
They do not want slots being distributed by corrupt minor officials
at the schools or due to falsified information provided by applicants
assisted by knowledgeable parties such as Rick Singer.
There is no reason to think this is a “black swan” event253 and
that now schools are more diligent to ensure only the most capable
students are admitted.254 Because of the intentional nontransparent
nature of admissions and pricing, the problem continues. Parties
making donations help secure admission for selected students in
quid quo pro arrangements. Only when the institutions and
individuals who create the opportunities for corruption are held
accountable will students not from privileged backgrounds have
better opportunities to be admitted on individual merit. As Eric Pan
noted, “the duty to monitor serves as the best means the law has to
ensure that directors are attentive and vigilant against the
occurrence of harm to the corporation.”255 The same is true of college
and university boards. In Varsity Blues, everyone was prosecuted

251. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 216 (quoting a lower income high school’s
principal as saying that people like Singer were “plagiarizing a life” by using photos of their
athletic successes to bolster his clients’ false credentials).
252. SELINGO, supra note 12, at 178.
253. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2d ed. 2010). This refers to rare, surprising events with major effects that, after
the fact, some people claim could not have been forecast.
254. They need to be. Once a red flag has been raised, our Caremark analogy suggests a
breach of the ongoing duty to address compliance and ethics. See Paul E. McGreal, Corporate
Compliance Survey, 73 BUS. LAW. 817, 834 (2018) (“The director breaches this branch of the
Caremark duty if she learns of a specific gap or weakness in the organization’s compliance
and ethics program, but takes no action to address that failing.”).
255. Pan, supra note 21, at 210.
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except the institutions that generally benefit from their failure to
take the straightforward steps to prevent such corruption.256
In her discussion of Caremark as “soft law,” Professor Claire Hill
asked, “[w]hy is it unacceptable for companies to approach
compliance narrowly and formalistically, as merely a means to
avoid lawbreaking?”257 She answered the question she posed by
suggesting that there were both instrumental (formalism might not
be profit maximizing) and moral reasons for avoiding formalism.
In announcing the Varsity Blues investigations, the lead federal
prosecutor declared that “[t]here can be no separate college
admissions system for the wealthy and, I’ll add, there will not be a
separate criminal justice system either.”258 Except that there is. The
universities got off scot-free; no financial institution, car dealer, or
jewelry store would be treated so leniently by federal prosecutors
if they were caught being similarly cavalier about their obligations
under federal anti-money laundering laws. This needs to change.

256. Even if we are wrong that these duties directly apply to universities, university
officials, and university boards, the process can be improved by considering these factors as
if the laws do apply.
257. Hill, supra note 22, at 687.
258. KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 5, at 270.
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